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I. THE COMMISSION'S STATEMENT OP ISSUES IS 
OVERLY BROAD. 
Pet i t ioner , Morton Internat ional , Inc. ("Morton") does 
not agree with the Statement of Issues set forth in Respondent's, 
Utah State Tax Commission (the "Commission"), Brief because i t is 
overly broad and under inclusive. Morton's Statement of Issues 
set forth in i t s Brief specif ical ly defines the issues before the 
Court and should be followed, 
I I . UNDER THE UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACTf 
ISSUES AS TO STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ARE 
REVIEWED DE NOVO WITH NO DEFERENCE TO THE 
COMMISSION'S PRIOR DECISION. 
The Commiss ion ' s s t a t e m e n t of t h e s t a n d a r d of rev iew in 
t h i s c a s e i s i n c o r r e c t . Th i s Court r e c e n t l y r econf i rmed t h e w e l l 
e s t a b l i s h e d p r i n c i p l e t h a t i s s u e s of law a r e t o be rev iewed de 
novo w i t h no d e f e r e n c e g iven t o a lower c o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n . E . g . , 
Kenneco t t Copper C o r p o r a t i o n v . S a l t Lake County, 145 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 , 4 (October 12 , 1 9 9 0 ) . Th i s Court has l i k e w i s e r e p e a t e d l y 
h e l d t h a t t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or c o n s t r u c t i o n of s t a t u t o r y 
1
 As stated by the Commission, the issues are whether the Commission cor-
rec t ly ruled in i t s favor and against Morton. While that statement of the 
issues i s not incorrect , the Commission's statement i s not helpful to th i s 
Court. Specifically the issues are (1) whether the Commission should narrowly 
define the statutory words "synthetic fuel" as a Hterm of artM or by the coo-
mon and ordinary meaning of the words; and (2) whether "equipment" should be 
defined according to a common understanding of how property actually func-
t ions , rather than how i t theoret ical ly could operate. 
language i s a legal i s sue . The "correction-of-error standard 
a lso applies when the issue i s one of basic l e g i s l a t i v e intent ." 
The Commission correct ly notes that Section 63-46b-16 
(1988) applies to th i s proceeding, and that a f inal determination 
4 
in t h i s matter must be made on the record. However, the Commis-
s ion i s wrong in arguing that th i s Court must defer to the Com-
miss ion's dec i s ion . In Bevans v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
790 P.2d 573 (Utah 1990), applying post-Utah Administrative Pro-
cedures Act ("UAPAM) law, th i s Court confirmed i t s e a r l i e r dec i -
s ions (applying pre-UAPA law) on the appropriate standard of 
review of an agency's interpretation or construction of a s t a t -
ute . In Bevans, th i s Court f i r s t noted that "[u]nder the r e l e -
vant portion of sect ion 63-46b-16(4)(d) (1989), we can grant 
r e l i e f to Bevans if the agency 'erroneously interpreted' the law 
to h i s substant ia l prejudice." i d . at 575. The Court continued 
2
 E.g., Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Commission of Utah, 791 P.2d 511, 513 
(Utah 1990) ("questions of statutory construction are matters of law for the 
courts, and we rely on a 'correction of error standard of review, according no 
deference to an administrative agency's interpretation.'") (Emphasis added). 
3
 Hurley v. Board of Review of Industrial Commission of Utah, 767 P.2d 
524, 527 (Utah 1988). 
4
 This Court recently remanded a proceeding back to the Commission because 
of the Commission's failure to base i t s decision on the record. The Commis-
sion apparently believed i t had the authority and discretion to make findings 
outside of the record. This Court rejected that notion stating Hthe Tax Com-
mission [does not have] the unbridled discretioa to make findings of fact 
beyond the scope of what i s presented in the hearings. . . .M First National 
Bank of Boston v. County Board of Equalization, 145 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 9 (Octo-
ber 16, 1990). In this case the Commission's failure i s similar. As 
explained infra, the Commission disregarded the evidence presented at the 
hearing to make inadequate and unsupported findings. 
- 2 -
to explain what is the appropriate standard of review to deter-
mine if the agency "erroneously interpreted" the law: 
[C]ourts generally give little deference to 
the agency, with the result that a court may 
decide that the agency has erroneously inter-
preted the law if the court merely disagrees 
with the agency's interpretation. 
Id, (emphasis added) (citing the official comment to the identi-
cal provision in the 1981 Model State Administrative Procedures 
Act). The Court then concluded: 
[U]nder section 63-46b-16(4)(d) of the 
UAPA, it is still appropriate for a court to 
review an agency's interpretation of its 
statutorily granted powers and authority as a 
question of law, with no deference to the 
Agency's view of the law. We therefore apply 
the correction of error standard to such an 
issue and uphold the Commission's statutory 
interpretation only if we conclude it is not 
erroneous. 
Id. at 576. (footnote omitted). 
The facts in this case are not disputed. Instead, 
the issues in this case are legal issues involving the proper 
statutory construction or interpretation of Section 59-12-104(15) 
and (16). As this Court has repeatedly held, it should review 
the record de novo, and reach its own conclusion as to the appro-
priate construction of the statute in question giving no defer-
ence to the Commission's prior decision. Moreover, 
the Commission's decision is arbitrary and unsupported by 
-3-
subs tan t ia l evidence when viewed in l ight of the whole record as 
the Commission has se lec t ive ly ignored the undisputed fac t s . 
For the reasons la te r explained herein and in Morton's 
Brief, the Commission erroneously interpreted the relevant law, 
and denied Morton's request for a refund of subs tant ia l amounts 
in sa les taxes paid with respect to Morton's f a c i l i t i e s . Morton 
has been and is being deprived of i t s property as a resu l t of the 
Commission's improper and unlawful decision. Morton therefore 
has been "substant ia l ly prejudiced" and is en t i t l ed to the re l ie f 
provided for under the UAPA. 
I I I . THE COMMISSION FAILED TO STATE ALL RELEVANT 
FACTS. 
Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure, the Commission's Brief is required to s t a t e those facts 
"relevant to the issues presented for review." The Statement of 
Facts the Commission presented is c lear ly incomplete. Conspicu-
ously absent from the Commission's Brief is a r ec i t a t ion of many 
facts re la t ing to the special designs, materials and functions 
5
 No deference to Commission findings of fact should be given in th is case 
because of the multiple fact-finding, prosecuting, and adjudicating functions 
the Commission exercised. These multiple functions ra ise due process and 
fairness issues because the same enti ty which supervises and formulates po l i -
cies for the Auditing Division also s i t s as the supposedly impartial adjudica-
tor of i t s own po l ic ies . See Utah Department of Administrative Services v. 
Public Service Commi ssion, 658 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah 1983) ("examples of th i s 
correction of error type of review include whether the Comnission has complied 
with the fairness requirements of due process"); Hurley v. Board of Review of 
Industr ia l Commission, 767 P.2d 524, 527 (footnote 3) (Utah 1988) ("in some 
cases, however, less deference i s given to factual determinations. For exam-
ple , a court may exercise greater scrutiny when const i tut ional r ights are at 
s take") ; and Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School Dis t r i c t , 
391 U.S. 563, 578 (footnote 2) (1968). 
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which Morton's facilities serve, and their integral relation to 
the production process, which are critical to a proper determina-
tion of the case. To the contrary, Morton's Brief recited in 
detail all the relevant facts necessary for a proper determina-
tion in this case. Significantly, the Commission did not dispute 
any of the facts Morton recited. This Court should therefore 
adopt Morton's Statement of Facts as set forth in its Brief. 
IV. SECTION 59-12-104(15) 
A. The Commission Attempts To Raise New 
Issues On Appeal. 
Respondent's Brief on page 19 states that "the Tax Com-
mission properly denied an exemption under Utah Code Ann. 
S 59-12-104(15) of Petitioner's sodium azide facility because it 
is not a 'processing and upgrading plant.'" Likewise, on page 6, 
the Respondent states that the Commission defined "'upgrading' 
according to the usual, ordinary, and accepted definitions of 
those terms within the fuels industry." These statements are 
misrepresentations, and an apparent attempt to raise new issues 
on appeal. Nowhere do the Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Final Decision (the "Decision") make any spe-
cific definition or finding as to what constitutes a "processing 
and upgrading plant," nor did the Commission base its decision to 
deny application of the sales tax exemption to Morton on a find-
ing that Morton's facilities did not constitute a "processing and 
upgrading plant." These terms are ignored and undefined in the 
Commission's Decision. Based on the Commission's Decision, 
-5-
therefore, the scope of review in this appeal is limited to an 
interpretation of the term synthetic fuel as used within the 
meaning of Section 59-12-104(15), without deference to the Com-
mission, and not on what the Commission now apparently believes 
should have been decided. 
B. The Commission Failed To Define "Syn-
thetic Fuel" By Its Ordinary, Usually 
Accepted Meaning. 
The Commission limited the definition of synthetic fuel 
to a "term of art" without any statutory or legislative guidance 
to so restrict or define the term. While case law provides that 
tax exemptions should be narrowly applied to the facts of a given 
case, this narrow application of law to facts does not give the 
Commission license to narrowly define statutory terms without 
some legislative or statutory directive. 
Instead, the intent and meaning of statutory terms must 
first be understood before the statute can be narrowly applied to 
the facts of a given case. To determine a statute's meaning and 
intent, the normal rules of statutory construction should apply, 
which require that terms should be given their plain and ordinary 
meanings. An example of this process is Pacific Intermountain 
Express Co. v. State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 2d 144, 329 P.2d 650, 
652 (1958) where this Court first defined the term "motor 
-6-
v e h i c l e " according t o i t s ordinary and natural meaning, be fore 
a p p l i c a t i o n of the term in the context of the tax exemption 
s t a t u t e . 
The Commission ignores t h i s proces s by d e v i a t i n g from 
the common and ordinary d e f i n i t i o n of the term s y n t h e t i c f u e l , 
and s u b s t i t u t i n g a more narrow "term of art" d e f i n i t i o n , without 
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y and because the s t a t u t e at i s s u e i s an exemp-
t i o n s t a t u t e . Compounding i t s e rror , the Commission r e j e c t s (and 
even r i d i c u l e s ) Morton's use of a d i c t i o n a r y to d e f i n e s y n t h e t i c 
f u e l . Morton's Brief c i t e s s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s in which t h i s Court 
has r e f e r r e d t o d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n s for guidance in i n t e r p r e t -
ing s t a t u t o r y terms to a s c e r t a i n t h e i r p l a i n and ordinary mean-
7 
m g , as Morton d id to d e f i n e s y n t h e t i c f u e l . 
In o p p o s i t i o n to t h i s method of d e f i n i n g s y n t h e t i c 
f u e l , on page 16 of i t s Br ie f , the Commission s t a t e s that "none 
of the c a s e s which p e t i t i o n e r c i t e s used d i c t i o n a r y d e f i n i t i o n s 
t o d e f i n e a term of art such as s y n t h e t i c f u e l which d e r i v e s i t s 
meaning from the s c i e n t i f i c community." The Commission's 
See Ladish Malting Co. v. Wise. Dept. of Revenue, 297 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1980) discussed in Section V.A. infra, where the Wisconsin court, 
applying a tax exemption statute, f irst defined statutory terms according to 
their ordinary and commonly accepted meanings before giving that definition a 
"strict but reasonable" application to the facts, 
7
 Contrary to the Commission's argument, the Court has also used the dic-
tionary to define technical or scientific words, see e .g . , Savage Bros. Inc. 
v. Public Service Comm'n, 723 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah 1985) (in attempting to 
define "dry chemicals" and "barite" as used in a certificate of convenience 
and necessity, the Court used the following dictionary definition of "chemi-
cal": N[w]e note that a common, generally accepted definition of 'chemical1 i s 
'a substance (as an element or chemical compound) obtained by chemical process 
or used for producing a chemical effect. '") (emphasis in original) . 
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argument is improper and misleading because it assumes away the 
very issue of this case; i,e., whether, without any legislative 
or statutory direction or indication, the Commission can presume 
that synthetic fuel is to be defined as a term of art, and lim-
ited to Dr. Wiser's definition as used in the oil and gas fuels 
o 
industry, to the exclusion of other fuels industr ies . 
Nowhere in the l e g i s l a t i v e history i s synthet ic fuel 
defined, nor i s there any indication that synthet ic fuel should 
be given a s p e c i f i c or "term of art" de f in i t ion as used in one 
segment of the fue ls industry. Nor i s there any statutory d i rec -
t i v e that synthet ic fuel should have any part icular meaning. In 
f a c t , as Mr. Anderson t e s t i f i e d , no one at the Commission knew 
what the term synthet ic fuel was intended to mean. Tr. at 123. 
Words or phrases which are to be given a s p e c i f i c de f in i t i on or 
treated as a "term of art" are, in most instances , s p e c i f i c a l l y 
defined or se t forth in a de f in i t iona l sect ion as a prelude to 
the s tatutory provis ion. No such statutory d irect ion i s present 
in t h i s case . 
There i s no authority or basis for the Commission to 
re jec t a plain and ordinary de f in i t ion of the term synthet ic 
f u e l , as provided by Dr. Taylor or as defined in the d ict ionary , 
8 The Commission's reliance on a term of art advocated by Dr. Wiser is 
itself reversible error. As this Court has already stated in First National 
Bank of Boston, supra at 9, "the Tax Commission [does not have] the unbridled 
discretion to make findings of fact beyond the scope of what is presented in 
the hearings . . ." There was no testimony at the hearing to the effect that 
the Legislature used synthetic fuel as Dr. Wiser's Mterm of art" definition. 
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in favor of Dr. Wiser's narrow def in i t ion applicable only to the 
o i l and gas segment of industry. In fact , the Commission never 
held that Morton's def in i t ion was not the plain or ordinary d e f i -
n i t ion of the term synthetic fue l . Rather, the Commission 
rejected a common def in i t ion in favor of an o i l and gas f u e l ' s 
de f in i t i on advocated by Dr. Wiser. As evident from the record, 
Dr. Wiser's experience and the framework from which he defines 
synthet ic fuel i s l imited to the o i l and gas industry. Yet, Dr. 
Wiser's testimony i s riddled with incons i s tenc ies . Under cross 
examination, Dr. Wiser admitted that he was not consulted when 
the Legislature passed the synthetic fuel exemption, and that he 
had no idea what the Legislature meant. He also admitted that 
h i s de f in i t i on was at odds with the def in i t ion of synthet ic fuel 
as defined in federal law, even though he claimed to have had 
9 input into federal s t a t u t e s . 
9
 Transcript p. 197 line 23 through p. 198 line 4. 
Q [by Mr. Miller] Let me read i t [the federal statute] again. 
A [by Dr. Wiser] All right. 
Q HThe term 'synthetic fuel1 means any solid, liquid, or gas." 
I'm not asking you whether you agree or disagree with the 
definition. That definition is inconsistent with what you 
just told us? 
A That's correct. It i s inconsistent. 
Transcript p. 204 line 5 through line 12, (emphasis added). 
Q [by Mr. Miller] All right. Let me probe your understanding 
of something else . Didn't you testify a moment ago that you 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The difficulty with the Commission's Decision is that 
the statutory terms are defined as if Dr. Wiser and the Commis-
sion had drafted them, rather than the Legislature. For example, 
the Commission first adopts Dr. Wiser's definition of synthetic 
fuel which applies only to liquid or gaseous materials. To 
justify this definition, which is directed to the oil and gas 
industry, the Commission cites Dr. Wiser's testimony where he 
states: "foremost in the minds of the people involved in syn-
thetic fuels [is] to try to take the pressure off of petroleum 
and off of natural gas to, in the first instance, to reduce our 
dependence on foreign oil." Commission's Brief at 12 (emphasis 
added). What is in the minds of Dr. Wiser or his associates in 
the oil and gas industry is irrelevant. The critical inquiry is 
what was in the minds of the legislators. The Commission improp-
erly assumes that the mindset of Dr. Wiser was the mindset of the 
Legislature when the statute was enacted. Clearly absent is any 
indication that the legislators had in their minds to exclude 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
had no conversations with the [Utah] Legislature when they 
passed this particular exemption? 
A [by Dr. Wiser] That's correct. I did not. 
Q You don't have any idea of what they mean, did you? 
A No. • . • 
*0 Once again, it should be noted that the only real difference between 
Morton's definition and that of Dr. Wiser*s, is that Dr. Wiser1s definition 
excludes solid synthetic fuels, otherwise Morton's fuel pellets satisfy Dr. 
Wiser's definition. See Morton's Brief at 25. 
-10-
s o l i d materials from the term synthetic fue l . Moreover, 
nowhere i s there any indication that synthet ic fuels should be 
l imited to only those applications in the o i l and gas industry. 
Dr. Wiser1s def in i t ion i s inappropriate not because i t 
i s t echnica l ly wrong, but because i t i s underinclusive as i t 
r e la te s to the ent ire fuels industry. There are many applica-
t ions of synthet ic fuels as alternate energy sources to tradi -
t iona l combustible materials used in industry. Dr. Wiser and Dr. 
Taylor both t e s t i f i e d that a synthetic fuel i s a material 
combusted to produce energy. There are many other instances 
beyond the o i l and gas industry where man-made materials are 
12 
combusted to produce energy. The fact i s that the fuel p e l l e t , 
l ike many other synthet ic fuels which have applications outside 
of the o i l and gas industry, i s combusted to produce energy and 
as such represents an alternate energy source to natural, deple t -
ing resources of combustible fue l s . It i s arbitrary, unfair and 
improper to l imit the application of Section 59-12-104(15) to 
only synthet ic fue ls used in the o i l and gas industry, to the 
See the Commission's Hearing Memorandum at 9, Record at 92, where the 
Commission first argued for a definition of synthetic fuel that followed a 
federal definition which includes solid materials. 
1 2
 See e .g . , Official Code of Georgia S 38-3-3(3) (1990) which defines 
"energy resources" to include "all forms of energy or power including. . . 
other fuels of any description. . . ." (Emphasis added); O.C.G.A. 
S 38-3-3(4)(K) (1990) which defines "fuel" in part as any "other substance 
used primarily for i t s energy content." (Emphasis added); and Revised Code of 
Washington S 43.21F.025(1) which defines "energy" in part as "any other sub-
stance or process used to produce heat, light or motion;. . . " (Emphasis 
added.) 
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exclusion of other applications in the fuels industry, without 
some legislative or statutory guidance. 
Aside from the general rule that statutory words are to 
be given their plain and ordinary meaning, the term synthetic 
fuel as used in Section 59-12-104(15) should not be interpreted 
as a term of art because there is no basis in case law for making 
such a definition. Terms or phrases which are treated as terms 
of art are phrases that have well-established, widely accepted, 
13 
or previously defined meanings. For instance, in Atlas Corp. 
v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1987), Clovis 
asserted that the term "net profits interest" is a term of art in 
the mineral industry that defines an independent estate in land. 
Id. The Court rejected Clovis1 assertion that "net profits 
interests" should be defined as a term of art because it has not: 
acquired a fixed and immutable meaning. . . . 
There is no body of law that clearly defines 
the nature and incidents of the net profits 
interest. Because the term "net profits 
interest" has no uniform meaning, we believe 
that "the nature of the [net profits] inter-
est and the rights of its owner must be 
determined from the provisions of the instru-
ment which created it." 
13
 "[A]bsent express direction to the contrary, we presume that a term of 
art used in a statute is to be given its usual legal definition." Kelson v. 
Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Utah 1989). 
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Id , ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . 
There i s no body of Utah law that d e f i n e s s y n t h e t i c 
f u e l as Dr. Wiser def ined i t . There are no Utah s t a t u t e s or 
15 
c a s e s which d e f i n e the term. Moreover, as Dr. Wiser admitted 
(Tr. at 1 9 7 - 2 0 5 ) , the d e f i n i t i o n s of s y n t h e t i c f u e l found in f e d -
e r a l law are i n c o n s i s t e n t with the d e f i n i t i o n urged by Dr. Wiser 
and adopted by the Commission. 
There i s l i k e w i s e no reason why the separate words or 
terms of a phrase cannot and should not be s e p a r a t e l y de f ined and 
then combined to d e f i n e a g iven phrase , even i f the phrase i s a 
term of a r t . For example, in S t a t e v . Gaxio la , 550 P.2d 1298, 
1303 (Utah 1976 ) , a jury requested c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the term 
"extreme mental or emotional d is turbance" as used in S e c t i o n 
76-95-205 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . The t r i a l court i n s t r u c t e d the jurors to g i v e 
the terms the meaning they would have in common every day use and 
d e f i n e d the words, "extreme," "mental" and "emotional" as de f ined 
1 4
 Examples of terms which have specific meanings, and are commonly under-
stood as terms of art can be seen in various court decisions. See Hansen v. 
Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838, 842 (Utah 1989) ("The term 'governmental 
function'. . . i s a term of art long in use by the courts to define those 
act iv i t ies of governmental entities to which common law sovereign imnunity 
applied"); State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 260 footnote 3 (Utah 1988) ("the 
term 'specific intent' has an accepted meaning as a term of art"); State v. 
Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280, 1285 (Utah 1983) (the Court used the dictionary to 
define "simulated" in the phrase "simulated sexual conduct" as i t does not 
constitute a legal term of art, and is recognizable in simple lay terms). 
1 5
 "Synthetic fuel" i s not defined in Utah law although there are limited 
references to the term. The Utah Code and cases also include hundreds of 
references to "fuel" and a handful of references to "synthetic," where syn-
thetic i s used as an adjective modifying a noun. 
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in the dictionary. The defendant objected claiming that "extreme 
'mental or emotional disturbance' is a term of art, which derives 
its meaning from usage and not from the individual words." Id. 
Upon review of the instruction given by the trial court, this 
Court found no error or prejudice to the defendant in individu-
ally defining the terms of the statutory phrase. Id. 
In summary, the Commission erroneously assumes, without 
authority, evidence or findings that (1) synthetic fuel is a 
"term of art"; and (2) the legislature enacting Section 
59-12-104(15) intended synthetic fuel to be defined as a term of 
art and given a restrictive meaning within a narrow segment of 
the oil and gas industry. Accordingly, the Commission's Decision 
is in error and should be reversed. 
C. The Commission's Definition Of Synthetic 
Fuel Is Not Consistent With The Legisla-
tive History. 
The Commission adopted a definition of synthetic fuel 
limited to liquid or gaseous materials used as substitutes in the 
oil and gas industry. By this definition, the Commission is tak-
ing an inconsistent position with what it believes is the legis-
lative history underlying Section 59-12-104(15). The Commission 
argues that the statute's legislative history indicates a legis-
lative intent to benefit the mining industry. Yet, the Commis-
sion's definition of synthetic fuel, limited to liquid or gaseous 
materials applicable in the oil and gas industry, has no rela-
tionship to Utah's mining industry and no relationship to Section 
59-12-104(15). In fact, the Legislature specifically excluded 
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the oil and gas industry from consideration under this statute. 
In its Brief, page 22, the Commission cited Senator Bunnel who 
stated: "The gas and oil sector in Utah is not a problem that is 
in need of assistance and that is in need of investment." The 
Commission has failed to explain why an oil and gas definition 
should be followed when the Legislature specifically excluded the 
oil and gas industry from consideration. 
Contrary to the Commission's assertions, Morton's oper-
ations do have a direct and real relation to the mining industry. 
While it is true that Morton does not engage in actual mining 
operations, Morton's fuel pellet is the product of the processing 
and upgrading of various minerals which are extracted (mined) 
from the ground. The statute does not require actual mining 
activity to be entitled to its benefit. A person who runs a mill 
or reduction works, but engages in no extraction activities, 
would be entitled to relief. 
Finally, the Legislature's underlying intent behind the 
enactment of the statute was to promote investment in capital 
intensive industry and to stimulate employment in Utah. Morton's 
Hearing Memorandum at 26, Record at 159. Against this backdrop, 
the Legislature included "synthetic fuel processing and upgrading 
plants." At the time the Legislature included this term in the 
statute, there were no synthetic fuel plants in Utah, nor did the 
Legislature have a complete idea of what would constitute a syn-
thetic fuel plant. Ld. (footnote 6). As noted earlier, Mr. 
Anderson who drafted the rule underlying this exemption testified 
-15-
that neither he, nor anyone at the Commission, understood what 
synthetic fuel was meant to include. To construe this statute 
against taxpayers who have brought capital intensive industry to 
Utah whose operations satisfy the normal and ordinary definition 
of the term synthetic fuel, is improper and contrary to the Leg-
islature's intent. 
V. SECTION 59-12-104(16). 
A. As Applied In Other Jur i sd ic t ions , 
Morton's F a c i l i t i e s Should Be Treated As 
Equipment Because They Are Designed And 
Function As Equipment. 
The Commission would have th i s Court be l ieve that there 
i s no case law or legal precedent which focuses on a s tructure ' s 
design and function to determine if i t i s machinery or equipment 
in connection with statutory provisions exempting machinery and 
equipment from taxat ion. The Commission has gone so far as to 
represent to t h i s Court that no such t e s t e x i s t s and that the 
courts have uniformly rejected such a notion, always concluding 
that buildings permanently attached to land can never be treated 
as tangible personal property. These statements are incorrect , 
misleading and misrepresentations of ex i s t ing case law applying 
"machinery and equipment" exemption s ta tu te s in other 
1 6
 See specifically the Commission's Brief at 42. "The far-reaching case 
law, in addition to supplemental sources, confirms that Petitioner's buildings 
or structures qualify as real property, and do not fa l l within the 'equipment1 
exemption allowed by Utah Code Ann. S 59-12-104(16) or Rule 85S(B). Essen-
t i a l l y , each of the cases directs that any building or structure affixed to 
the land i s indisputably real property in any sense of the word. Further, the 
Courts have found unpersuasive the argument that Ibuildings permanently affixed 
to land can possibly qualify as tangible personal property as Petitioner 
argues•" Commission's Brief at 42 (Emphasis added). 
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j u r i s d i c t i o n s . Morton did not create a functional use t e s t to 
determine if a structure could qualify as machinery or equipment. 
The functional use t e s t i s well establ ished and followed in var i -
ous j u r i s d i c t i o n s . In fact , the very cases c i ted by the 
18 Commission apply th i s functional use t e s t . For example, the 
Commission c i t e s to Busch where the court held a greenhouse to be 
real property and not machinery for purposes of a Minnesota s t a t -
ute that excluded machinery from the def in i t ion of real e s ta te 
subject to taxat ion. What the Commission fa i l ed to d i s c l o s e i s 
that in Busch, the court used a "functionality tes t" as fo l lows: 
To be exempt as equipment, an item must per-
form functions d i s t inc t and dif ferent from 
the functions ordinarily performed by bui ld-
ings and other taxable s tructures . 
Id. at 815, c i t ing Crown Coco at 274. 
The court in Busch held that the greenhouse was real ty 
because the lower court made spec i f i c findings of fact that the 
greenhouse served the same shel ter functions as a tradi t iona l 
bui lding, and the court was unwilling to overturn those 
1 7
 The Commission's references to case law defining "buildings" or "real 
property" are likewise misleading because those cases do not involve "machin-
ery and equipment" exemption statutes. As stated by the Utah Court of 
Appeals: "What i s a building must always be a question of degree." Wagner 
Assoc, v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1128 (Utah App. 1990). Accordingly, 
the definition of a "building" or "real property" will vary with the context 
in which i t must be construed. See Crown Coco, Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 336 
N.W. 2d 272, 274 (Minn. 1983) (in determining whether a certain structure was 
a building or equipment, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "equipment is an 
exceedingly elast ic term, the meaning of which depends on the context." 
(Emphasis added). 
1 8
 Busch v . County of Hennepin, 380 N.W.2d 813 (Minn. 1986) and Crown Coco, 
Inc. v . Comm'r of Revenue, 336 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. 1983). 
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f i n d i n g s . The Commission would have t h i s Court abide by the 
20 
r e s u l t in Busch, but not by i t s a n a l y s i s or s tandards . 
This same f u n c t i o n a l use t e s t has been r e p e a t e d l y used 
in o ther j u r i s d i c t i o n s . For example, the Wisconsin Court of 
21 Appeals has used t h i s t e s t in applying a Wisconsin s t a t u t e that 
exempts from property t a x a t i o n w [ m a n u f a c t u r i n g machinery and 
s p e c i f i c p r o c e s s i n g equipment, e x c l u s i v e l y and d i r e c t l y used by a 
manufacturer in manufacturing t a n g i b l e personal p r o p e r t y . " 
Ladish at 56 . The Wisconsin s t a t u t e i s s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r t o the 
c a s e a t hand in that i t a l s o s p e c i f i c a l l y exc ludes "bu i ld ings or 
b u i l d i n g components" from a p p l i c a t i o n of the machinery and e q u i p -
ment exemption. Id. 
In Ladish, the court was confronted with whether c e r -
t a i n s t r u c t u r e s c o n s t i t u t e d machinery or equipment pursuant to 
the exemption s t a t u t e . As noted by the c o u r t , a l l t h e s e 
1 9
 But ^ee, Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Greiling, 334 N.W.2d 118, 121 
(Wise. 1983) (the Wisconsin Supreme Court, applying the "functional use" test 
instead of the "narrow physical appearance" test , held that a greenhouse was 
machinery because i t "has an active function of creating and controlling an 
environment conducive to the production of floriculture crops.") 
20 See Crown Coco, cited by the Commission, which also followed the func-
tional use test ; see KDAL Inc. v. County of St„ Louis, 240 N.W.2d 560, 561 
(Minn. 1970) (the court held that a support tower for a television antenna 
constitutes equipment because of i t s function irrespective of the fact the 
tower was anchored or otherwise attached to real property); see also, Union 
Grain Terminal Association v. County of Winona, Nos. 34855 and 35970 (Minn. 
T.C. Dec. 15, 1983) (holding that malt houses and kiln buildings were, in 
large part, the exterior shells of equipment). 
2 1
 See Ladish Malting Co. v. Wise. Dept. of Revenue, 297 N.W.2d 56 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 1980); Pabst Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 373 N.W.2d 680 (Wise. 
Ct. App. 1985) and Heileman Brewing Company v. City of La Crosse, 381 N.W.2d 
619 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985) (unpublished opinion, available on Lexis). Ladish 
and Pabst are attached hereto as Exhibits A and B. 
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structures "have walls, floors, and ceilings or roof. All are 
very large structures. . . . All have a 'building-like' appear-
ance from the outside." Id. at 57. The court cited with 
approval the lower court's framing of the central issue: 
What is the meaning of "buildings or building 
components"? The noun "building", considered 
outside of any factual context is an inert 
concept noting in its broadest possible sense 
the enclosure of space. . . . Was it the 
intent of the legislature to exclude from 
exemption any creation which encloses space, 
even though it also may functionally contrib-
ute to the "transformation of substance"? 
Even applying a "strict but reasonable" meaning of the 
22 
statute, the court was unable to apply the statute to the 
structures at issue because, as the court noted, the structures 
all had "the external appearance of buildings, but are designed 
to function exclusively as machinery. Neither could the struc-
tures perform their intended functions without walls, floors, 
ceilings, and foundations which make them building-like in 
appearance." id. at 58-59. 
Because the application of the statute was unclear, the 
court went on to cite with approval various other jurisdictions, 
both state and federal investment tax credit cases, for their 
treatment of structures to be classified as buildings or machin-
ery. See cases discussed in Ladish at 60-61. Most notable is 
the court's statement that: 
22 M[A] strict construction is nonetheless a construction, and an exemption 
statute need not be given an unreasonable construction or the narrowest possi-
ble construction. A 'strict but reasonable' construction seems to be the 
pithy and popular statement of the rule." Id. (citations omitted). 
-19-
We need not adopt a strict conformity test, 
however, in order to accept persuasive rea-
soning of courts in other jurisdictions which 
have construed statutes similar to our own. 
Several such cases, both federal and state, 
have resolved issues similar to that before 
us by rejecting a narrow "physical appear-
ance" test and applying a "function or use" 
test. Under that test the central question 
is whether the structure is one "whose util-
ity is principally and primarily a signifi-
cantly contributive factor in the actual man-
ufacture or production of the product 
itself." Mertens, 5 Law of Federal Income 
Taxation sec. 32A.14, at 50 (rev. ed. 1980). 
23 
Id. at 60 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
Finally, in sanctioning the use of a functionality test 
the court stated: 
A definition of "buildings" and of "machinery 
and equipment" which emphasizes actual func-
tion and use over physical appearance, sheer 
size, and remotely potential use, elevates 
substance over form. It also makes sense. 
Id. at 62. 24 
The court in Ladish ignored the structures 1 
bui ld ing - l ike appearance, noting that the structures did not 
2 3
 It should be noted that the test cited by the court, from Mertens, per-
tains to the federal investment tax credit provisions. Morton agrees with the 
court in Ladish and reasserts that the federal guidelines under I.R.C. S 38 
provide "persuasive reasoning" as to the construction and application of 
Utah's machinery and equipment exemption statute. 
2 4
 See also Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 466-470 (1935) (the Gregory 
case i s a landmark tax case which i s repeatedly cited for the proposition that 
form should not be elevated over substance. "To hold otherwise would be to 
exalt art i f ice above reality and to deprive the statutory provision in ques-
tion of a l l serious purpose.") 
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serve the functions of a tradit ional building, and concluded 
that because the structures were designed and functioned as 
machinery, they should be so treated. 
Five years later the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
reviewed a s imilar factual case in Pabst, supra, under the same 
machinery and equipment exemption s ta tu te . Once again, the court 
followed the functional use over an appearance t e s t and concluded 
26 
that Pabst's structures were designed and functioned as equip-
ment and should not be treated, for purposes of the exemption 
s t a t u t e , as bui ldings . As stated by the court, "a s tructure ' s 
external appearance does not determine whether i t i s a bui lding. 
Rather, the question i s whether the structure i s being used as a 
building in the taxpayer's hands." Id. at 685 (emphasis added). 
The court went on to s t a t e : 
The passive nature of the ce l lar walls and 
framing must not be allowed to obscure the 
fact that their so le reason for existence i s 
to create the conditions that permit fermen-
tat ion of beer on a mass-production s c a l e . 
2 5
 "The three structures may be entered by employees for maintenance or 
clearing but are not generally occupied by employees during the course of 
manufacturing process." Id. at 58. Note the similarity with Morton's fac i l i -
t i e s where employees are not permitted inside the fac i l i t i e s during 
operations. 
26 xhe "head house" i s "a 56-feet ta l l structure. . . of poured concrete" 
and the malt house "has six stores, multiple rooms, stairs, an elevator, and 
office space." Id. at 688. 
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id. at 691. 
The fact that some human activity, inci-
dental to a structure's function, is carried 
on within the structure, does not mean, that 
the structure provides general working space. 
Id. at 688. 
Contrary to the Commission's asser t ions , t h i s issue has 
been addressed in various other jur i sd ic t ions which have adopted 
a functional use t e s t . The record in t h i s case i s c lear and 
uncontroverted, Morton's f a c i l i t i e s were designed to function as 
equipment. These f a c i l i t i e s are e s sent ia l to production and thus 
qual i fy for exemption under the s t a t u t e . The Commission's Deci-
s ion and Brief demonstrate an unwillingness to admit that a 
f a c i l i t y which serves the function and purpose of equipment may 
be treated as such for purposes of Section 59-5-104(16) . The 
Commission provided no testimony or evidence rebutting Morton's 
extens ive testimony that the f a c i l i t i e s operate as equipment and 
are e s s e n t i a l to operations. The Commission's only attempt to 
2 7
 The court also cited Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Wanamaker, 144 
N.Y.S.2d 458, 462 (App. Div. 1955), aff'd, 157 N.Y.S.2d 972 (1956) which 
stated: 
The structures and supports which house and steady the 
machinery are essential to production. They are phys-
ical ly annexed to the machinery, specially designed 
therefor, and necessary to the proper functioning 
thereof. As a whole, the plant i s a producing unit. 
The structures do not play as active a role as, for 
example, the turbine. But activity i s not the test of 
directness. The walls of the boiler have a "passive" 
function in one sense. The important thing i s that 
a l l parts of the plant contribute, continuously and 
v i ta l ly , to production, and they are a l l integrated 
and harmonized. (Emphasis added) 
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show that the f a c i l i t i e s are not e s s e n t i a l t o o p e r a t i o n s i s a 
r e f e r e n c e t o Kurt H a l l e s y ' s test imony that i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y 
p o s s i b l e to conduct opera t ions with a s k e l e t a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . 
28 See p . 29 of the Commission's Br ie f . Yet , in a recent case 
d e a l i n g with s a l e s t a x a t i o n of computer so f tware , t h i s Court 
agreed with the Vermont Supreme Court 's observat ion that for pur-
poses of t a x a t i o n , t r a n s a c t i o n s should be taxed on what a c t u a l l y 
occurred and not based on some h y p o t h e t i c a l , t h e o r e t i c a l or unre-
29 
a l i s t i c b a s i s . 
B. The Uncontroverted Record E s t a b l i s h e s 
that Morton's F a c i l i t i e s Are Not Real 
Property . 
As t h i s Court s t r e s s e d in F i r s t Nat ional Bank of Bos-
t o n , supra, any d e c i s i o n rendered by the Commission must be based 
upon the record . That ru le i s important because , in the present 
c a s e , the record i s c l e a r and uncontroverted that Morton's f a c i l -
i t i e s f u n c t i o n as equipment; and c o n s i s t e n t with pr ior Commission 
a u d i t s , the f a c i l i t i e s should be t r e a t e d as t a n g i b l e personal 
property a t tached t o rea l property . Consider the Testimony of 
Calon K. Anderson. Mr. Anderson has 18 years of a u d i t i n g 
2 8
 This "theoretical" notion ignores the regulatory environment surrounding 
Morton's fac i l i t i e s which would prohibit Morton from operating i t s f a c i l i t i e s 
as the Commission theorizes. See, for example, Chapters 11, 13 and 14 of 
Tit le 26 of the Utah Code relating to the regulation of water, air and hazard-
ous waste pollution. 
29 »T 0 base the tax consequences of a transaction on how i t could have been 
structured 'would require rejection of the established tax principle that a 
transaction i s to be given i t s tax effect in accord with what actually 
occurred and not in accord with what might have occurred.'" Mark 0. Harold sen 
v. State Tax Commission, 148 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 28 (November 27, 1990) (empha-
s i s added) (citations omitted). See also Gregory, supra. 
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e x p e r i e n c e wi th the Commission, p e r s o n a l l y dra f ted Rule 85Sr and 
conducted over 100 audi t s* His tes t imony was c l e a r tha t Morton 
e s t a b l i s h e d an uncontroverted record that i t s f a c i l i t i e s were 
e n t i t l e d t o the r e l i e f provided by S e c t i o n 5 9 - 1 2 - 1 0 4 ( 1 6 ) . The 
Commission f a i l e d t o c a l l a s i n g l e w i t n e s s or provide any e v i -
dence t o r e f u t e Mr. Anderson's t e s t imony . The Commission's on ly 
r e b u t t a l t o Morton's w i t n e s s e s i s to make n e g a t i v e innuendos 
regarding h i s m o t i v e s . See page 25, f oo tno te 7 of the Commis-
s i o n ' s Br ie f ("Calon K. Anderson i s a former employee of the 
Audi t ing D i v i s i o n of the Utah S t a t e Tax Commission who parted on 
unpleasant terms from the Tax Commission because of d i f f e r e n c e s 
between h imse l f and the present D i r e c t o r of the Audit ing 
D i v i s i o n . " ) 3 0 
Based on h i s e x t e n s i v e exper ience as an a u d i t o r , Mr. 
Anderson a p p l i e d the same t e s t s in e v a l u a t i n g Morton's c la im for 
an exemption from s a l e s taxes which the Commission used in p r i o r 
30 This Court has already stated i t s opinion as to such remarks, "Deroga-
tory references to others or inappropriate language of any kind has no place 
in an appellate brief and i s of no assistance to this Court in attempting to 
resolve any legitimate issues presented on appeal." State v. Cooky 714 P.2d 
296f 297 (Utah 1986). 
American logicians Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel have given a brief 
definition of the Commission's technique in Cohen and Nagel, An Introduction 
to Logic and Scientific Method (1934), 380: "The fallacy of the argumentum ad 
hominem, a very ancient but s t i l l popular device to deny the logical force of 
an argument (and thus to prove the opposite), i s to abuse the one who advances 
the argument." 
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audits, Mr. Anderson likewise cited prior circumstances where 
permanent, building-like structures were not treated by the Com-
32 
mission as real property. This testimony lies in the record 
uncontroverted, but ignored. The Commission has not explained 
its inconsistent treatment of Morton's facilities, compared to 
other similar facilities, as required by Section 
63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii). 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission grossly erred in its responsibility to 
establish evidence or support in the record for its interpreta-
tion of the relevant statutes. If this Court is to give real 
meaning to its prior decisions that a final decision must stand 
upon the record, this Court must rule in favor of Morton and 
reverse the Decision of the Commission. 
DATED this 15th day of January, 1991. 
MAXWfcVt/A. MfLLfiR 
RANDY M. GRIMSHAW 
RICHARD M. MARSH 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for P e t i t i o n e r 
J i
 Moreover, Mr. Anderson used the same three part test followed by this 
Court. "In determining whether equipment has become a fixture, this Court has 
applied a three-part test : annexation, adaptation, and intent." General Leas-
ing v. Manifest Corp., 667 P.2d 586, 597 (Utah 1983). 
3 2
 See Morton's Brief at 36. 
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EXHIBIT A 
56 Wis. 297 NORTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
98 Wis.2d 496 
LADISH MALTING CO., a Wisconsin 
corporation, Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF REVE-
NUE, Defendant-Appellant, 
Town of Aztalan, Defendant. 
Nos. 79-495 to 79-498. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. 
Argued Aug. 21, 1980. 
Opinion Released Aug. 21, 1980. 
Opinion Filed Aug. 21, 1980. 
Review Denied. 
Department of Revenue appealed from 
judgment of the Circuit Court, Jefferson 
County, John B. Danforth, J., determining 
that certain property used by taxpayer in 
manufacture of malt was exempt from 
property taxes. The Court of Appeals, Ba-
blitch, J., held that attemporators, kilns, 
and malt elevators used in the malting 
process were machinery or equipment and 
not buildings within contemplation of stat-
ute exempting manufacturing machinery 
and processing equipment, but not build-
ings, from property taxation. 
Affirmed. 
Taxation *=>237 
Attemporators, kilns, and malt eleva-
tors, building-like structures used in trans-
formation of barley into malt, were machin-
ery or equipment and not buildings within 
contemplation of statute which exempted 
manufacturing machinery and processing 
equipment, but not buildings, from property 
taxation. W.S.A. 70.11(27). 
John C. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., for 
defendant-appellant; Bronson C. La Foi-
lette, Atty. Gen., and E. Weston Wood, 
Asst. Atty. Gen., on brief. 
John A. Hazelwood (argued) and Elwin J. 
Zarwell, Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, on 
brief, for plaintiff-respondent. 
Before GARTZKE, P. J., and BABLITCH 
and DYKMAN, JJ. 
BABLITCH, Judge. 
This is an appeal by the Wisconsin De-
partment of Revenue (department) from a 
judgment determining that certain proper-
ty used by the Ladish Malting Company 
(taxpayer) in the manufacture of malt was 
exempt from property taxes under sec. 70.-
11(27), Stats. The taxpayer brought four 
separate actions seeking declaratory judg-
ment and a refund of taxes paid to the 
defendant Town of Aztalan from 1974 
through 1977 based on the department's 
assessments. The town is not a party to 
this appeal. The actions were heard to-
gether on the basis of a detailed stipulation 
of facts, disposed of by a single judgment 
ordering a total refund of $375,125, and 
consolidated on appeal. We affirm. 
Section 70.11(27), Stats., was created by 
ch. 90, Laws of 1973, as a part of the budget 
bill. The subsection embodies the so-called 
"M & E" exemption from property taxation 
of "[manufacturing machinery and specific 
processing equipment, exclusively and di-
rectly used by a manufacturer in manufac-
turing tangible personal property." The 
exempted property is defined by the statute 
as: 
any combination of electrical, mechanical 
or chemical means, including special 
foundations therefor, designed to work 
together in the transformation of materi-
als or substances into new articles or 
components, including parts therefor, re-
gardless of ownership and regardless of 
attachment to real property. This shall 
not be construed to include materials, 
supplies, buildings or building compo-
nents; nor shall it include equipment, 
tools or implements used to service or 
maintain manufacturing machinery or 
equipment. [Emphasis supplied.] 
The disputed items of property are at-
temporators, kilns, and malt elevators. It is 
undisputed that each of these items is used 
LADISH MALTING v. WISC 
Cite as, Wis.Af 
exclusively and directly by the taxpayer in 
the transformation of barley into malt. 
The parties stipulate that "but for the 
building-building component exception" to 
the M & E exemption, the property would 
not be taxable. 
The department's main contention is that 
none of the properties is a machine because 
each of them is a "building" within the 
meaning of the italicized exclusion from the 
definition of machinery and equipment set 
forth above. In its reply brief on appeal, 
however, it also contends that the exemp-
tion "applies only to machinery which is not 
a building or building component." 
The department thereby proffers, though 
it does not press, two inconsistent views of 
the statute. Under its first contention ma-
chinery and equipment on the one hand, 
and buildings or building components on 
the other, are mutually exclusive categories 
of property. Under its second contention 
they are not. Because we agree with the 
trial court's determination that the struc-
tures in question are machinery or equip-
ment and are not buildings within the con-
templation of the statute, we need not ad-
dress the question whether it is possible for 
one structure to fit both categories simulta-
neously nor whether any such structure 
would be entitled to the statutory exemp-
tion. 
The structures involved in this case share 
certain characteristics. All have walls, 
floors, and ceilings or roofs. At least the 
kiln and the attemporator have founda-
tions. All are very large structures com-
porting, as the trial court noted, with the 
magnitude of the taxpayer's operations. 
All have a "building-like" appearance from 
the outside. Each performs an indepen-
dent, essential function in the manufactur-
ing process by which malt meeting the vari-
ous specifications of the taxpayer's custom-
ers is made. 
The parties agree that an attemporator is 
similar to a "giant air conditioner-humidifi-
er." Its function is to maintain the exact 
temperature and humidity conditions re-
quired to induce the germination of barley 
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kernels-the first step of the malt-making 
procedure-within "growing compartments" 
inside the taxpayer's malt house.1 Each 
attemporator consists of a fan and three 
compartments attached to a growing com-
partment. The fan forces air to circulate 
past water sprays in the compartments of 
the attemporator, where it is saturated to 
100 percent humidity. The air is then 
forced into the growing compartments. 
The parties agree that no part of the attem-
porator's walls, ceiling, or floor has any 
value solely on its own, and that the same 
are designed to channel the moisturized air 
through the attemporator and into the 
growing compartments. The outer shells of 
the taxpayer's attemporators, which are 
custom made, are composed of one-half 
inch of transite (a corrugated asbestos and 
concrete material), the same as the outer 
shell of the malt houses to which they are 
attached. Commercially produced attempo-
rators made of stainless steel are available 
on the market. They perform exactly the 
same function as the taxpayer's attempora-
tors and do not look like buildings. 
After germination has occurred to the 
desired degree, the resultant "green malt" 
is transferred to kilns, which are self-sup-
ported brick wall enclosures, for heating 
and drying. Huge fans at the top of the 
structure draw heated air up through three 
tiers of trays with perforated bottoms upon 
which the grain is spread. The trays have 
louvers which are opened manually from 
time to time to allow the grain at the 
higher levels to fall to the tray beneath at 
the appropriate stage in the drying process. 
The temperature inside the kiln may reach 
as high as 220 degrees Fahrenheit, depend-
ing on the type of malt being produced. 
After drying is completed to the required 
specifications, the grain is placed in malt 
elevators for aging and blending according 
to the individual customer's order. Aging 
is an organic process during which the mois-
ture content in the kernels of green malt 
stabilize at a uniform level from the center 
of each kernel to its outer shell. The tax-
1. The taxable status of the malt house itself is 
not at issue on this appeal 
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payer has more than 50 brewery customers, 
each of which specifies the length of time 
the ordered malt is to be aged and the 
particular mix of different malts desired. 
Externally the malt elevators look like bar-
ley elevators in which the barley is stored 
prior to the malt-making process. The tax-
able status of the storage elevators is not 
challenged by the taxpayer. The malt ele-
vators contain rows of bins in which differ-
ent types of malts are kept. The particular 
mix ordered by the customers is blended by 
regulating the flow of various malts onto 
conveyor belts beneath the bins. The final 
mix is transported to shipping bins, which 
are not involved in this appeal. 
The three structures may be entered by 
employees for maintenance or cleaning but 
are not generally occupied by employees 
during the course of the manufacturing 
process. The attemporators, kilns and malt 
elevators are monitored on an almost total-
ly automated basis from a central control 
room in a different location. 
Employees are not inside the attempora-
tors during any time they are operating. 
When employees enter the kilns each day to 
manually rotate the louvers and dump the 
tray floors, they must pass through an air 
lock adjoining the kiln because of the enor-
mous difference in external and internal air 
pressure. The temperature within the kiln 
is reduced to 100 degrees during such times. 
Access to the top of the malt elevators for 
servicing the conveyor equipment is provid-
ed by a concrete stair tower or a man lift. 
It is very unusual for an employee to be 
inside a malt bin, and this never occurs 
when there is an appreciable amount of 
malt within the bin. 
There are no plumbing, heating or cooling 
facilities within the three structures except 
as they specifically relate to the manufac-
turing processes which occur within them. 
There is electric wiring for lighting and 
manufacturing purposes, but no toilets, rest 
areas or other "creature comforts" inside 
any of them. 
We cannot improve on the trial court's 
designation of the central issue. It asked: 
REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
What is the meaning of "buildings or 
building components"? The noun "build-
ing", considered outside of any factual 
context is an inert concept noting in its 
broadest possible sense the enclosure of 
space. . . . Was it the intent of the 
legislature to exclude from exemption 
any creation which encloses space, even 
though it also may functionally contrib-
ute to the "transformation of substance"? 
The answers to these questions are not 
clear from the face of the statute, even 
applying the appropriate rules of construc-
tion. Pursuant to those rules, a tax exemp-
tion statute is to be strictly construed 
against granting the exemption since "tax 
exemptions, deductions and privileges are 
matters of legislative grace." Ramrod, Inc. 
v. Department of Revenue, 64 Wis.2d 499, 
504, 219 N.W.2d 604, 607 (1974). Moreover, 
the burden of bringing the property in 
question within the terms of the exemption 
is on the taxpayer, and any doubts that he 
has done so are to be resolved in favor of 
taxation. Ramrod, 64 Wis.2d at 504, 219 
N.W.2d at 607; First Nat Leasing Corp. v. 
Madison, 81 Wis.2d 205, 208,260 N.W.2d 251 
(1977). On the other hand, the supreme 
court has stated: 
"[A] strict construction is nonetheless a 
construction, and an exemption statute 
need not be given an unreasonable con-
struction or the narrowest possible con-
struction. A 'strict but reasonable' con-
struction seems to be the pithy and popu-
lar statement of the rule." Columbia 
Hospital Assn. v. Milwaukee, 35 Wis.2d 
660, 668, 151 N.W.2d 750, 754 (1967), 
quoted with approval in First Nat Leas-
ing Corp., 81 Wis. at 208-09, 260 N.W 2d 
at 253. 
The "strict but reasonable" meaning of 
the statute in question is elusive when ap-
plied to the structures at issue. The legisla-
ture plainly intended to exempt manufac-
turing machinery and equipment exclusive-
ly used in transforming raw products into 
merchantable goods, while withholding the 
exemption from buildings and building 
components. The three structures in this 
case all have the external appearance of 
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buildings, but are designed to function ex-
clusively as machinery The attemporators 
are giant air-conditioners and humidifiers 
The kilns are giant ovens Neither could 
perform their intended functions without 
the walls, floors, ceilings, and foundations 
which make them buildmg-hke in appear-
ance The malt-elevators, though less ma-
chine-like than the other two structures, 
are nonetheless more than passive storage 
units such as the barley or shipping eleva-
tors Within them an organic change in the 
malt takes place which is essential to the 
production process They are designed to 
custom-mix the different varieties of sepa-
rately aged malts to the specifications of 
each customer Their function is not dis-
similar from that of smaller specific pro-
cessing equipment designed, for example, to 
custom blend paints, dyes, or foods 
Neither the attemporators nor the kilns 
could be used as "buildings" in the common-
ly used sense of providing shelter for per-
sons or animals, or storage space for proper-
ty, without substantial alterations While 
the malt elevators could conceivably be 
used to shelter and store malt, their use is 
committed to a more ambitious purpose 
When the meaning of a statute is not 
clear on its face, we may look to extrinsic 
sources to determine legislative intent2 
Our examination of the legislative history 
of sec 70 11(27), Stats, persuades us that 
the legislature did not intend to include 
structures such as those at issue, which 
function as manufacturing machinery or 
equipment, within the "building-building 
component" exception to the M & E exemp-
tion 
The parties have stipulated that the lan-
guage of the statute as finally enacted was 
adopted by a conference committee of the 
legislature after meetings with representa-
tives of the department and of industry 
The meetings were requested by the com-
mittee, which was studying a proposed 
draft of a senate bill creating the M & E 
2. Monson v Monson 85 Wis 2d 794 800 271 
N W 2 d 137 (Ct App 1978) State e\ rel Gut 
brod v Wolke 49 Wis 2d 736 742 183 N W 2d 
161 (1971) Kmdy v Hayes 44 Wis 2d 301 
308, 171 N W 2 d 324 (1969) Perry Creek C 
exemption As a result of these meetings, 
the representatives of industry and of the 
department agreed on certain changes in 
the original language, which were incorpo-
rated by the committee in the bill reported 
out to and passed without further altera-
tion by both houses of the legislature 
The original draft of the bill excluded 
"structures or fixtures," rather than "build-
ings or building components," from the M & 
E exemption It also required that proper-
ty attached to real estate* must be "capable 
of removal without substantial damage" to 
the real estate in order to qualify for the 
exemption The latter requirement was 
stricken from the bill which was finally 
enacted, and the broad "structures or fix-
tures" language was replaced by the 
present, narrower "buildings and building 
components " But for these changes, there 
is little doubt that the property in question 
would not have qualified for the exemption 
The stipulation recites that the phrase 
"buildings and building components" was 
adopted by the committee at the suggestion 
of industrial representatives, who expressly 
stated that the change in language would 
bring the bill into conformity with a similar 
phrase in 26 U S C A sec 48(aXlXB) of the 
federal Internal Revenue Code relating to 
investment credits That section provides 
the credit for tangible personal property 
"used as an integral part of manufactur-
ing," but excludes "a building and its struc-
tural components " A known body of fed-
eral law had developed to interpret this 
phrase 
The taxpayer contends that the legisla-
ture's adoption of the phrase suggested by 
the industrial representatives evinces its in-
tent that the M & E exemption be con-
strued in conformity with the federal in-
vestment credit statute Under this ap-
proach, any property qualifying for the 
credit under federal authority, such as each 
of the structures involved in this case, 
Corp v Hopkins \g Chem Co 29 Wis 2d 429, 
435 139 N W 2d 96 (1966) Cttv of Milwaukee 
v Milwaukee County 27 Wis 2d 53, 56 133 
N W 2 d 3 9 3 (1965) 
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would presumably be entitled to the M & E 
exemption. We agree with the department 
that this approach is unwarranted.3 Al-
though the credit and the exemption were 
doubtless enacted for similar reasons-to 
stimulate business and encourage industrial 
investment-they relate to different kinds of 
taxes and serve the intended purpose in 
different ways. In addition, the expressed 
intention of individuals advising the legisla-
ture, through a conference committee, is 
inconclusive evidence of an identical legisla-
tive intention.4 
We need not adopt a strict conformity 
test, however, in order to accept persuasive 
reasoning of courts in other jurisdictions 
which have construed statutes similar to 
our own.5 Several such cases, both federal 
and state, have resolved issues similar to 
that before us by rejecting a narrow "physi-
cal appearance" test and applying a "func-
tion or use" test. Under that test the cen-
tral question is whether the structure is one 
"whose utility is principally and primarily a 
significantly contributive factor in the actu-
al manufacture or production of the product 
itself." Mertens, 5 Law of Federal Income 
Taxation sec. 32A.14, at 50 (rev. ed. 1980). 
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corporation 
v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263, 205 Ct.Cl. 
402 (1974), for example, the court held that 
large structures designed to age whiskey in 
a controlled environment, and which were 
entered by the taxpayer's employees only 
for repairs, maintenance, loading and un-
loading, were entitled to the investment 
3. Ladtsh Co. v Department of Revenue, 69 
Wis.2d 723, 233 N.W 2d 354 (1975), upon 
which the taxpayer relies, is inapposite The 
case dealt with the construction of a state in-
come tax statute which was virtually identical 
to its counterpart in the Internal Re\ enue Code, 
and an explanatory note to the bill which be-
came the statute indicated that uniformity be-
tween state and federal laws was intended 
Master Lock Co. v Department of Re\enue. 62 
Wis.2d 716, 215 N W2d 529 (1974) and Indus-
trial Comm v Woodlawn Cemetery Asso, 232 
Wis. 527, 287 N.W. 750 (1939), both of which 
dealt with identical state-federal statutes, are 
similarly distinguishable. 
4. See A. O. Smith Corp v. Department ot Re\ e-
nue, 43 Wis.2d 420. 427, 168 N W 2d 887, 890 
(1969), where the supreme court ruled that 
credit. The fact that the structures "have 
features in common with buildings" was 
held not to be determinative. The real 
question, the court said, was "whether they 
are functioning or being used as 'buildings' 
in the taxpayer's hands." 499 F.2d at 1271. 
A major consideration in answering that 
question was that the working space provid-
ed in the structures for employees was no 
more than "merely incidental to the princi-
pal function or use of the structure." 499 
F.2d at 1271. Cf. Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 
T.C. 113 (1972), appeal dismissed, see Thirup 
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 508 
F.2d 915, 918 n.2, A.L.R.Fed. 299 (9th Cir. 
1974), and Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972), 
rev'd. sub nom. Thirup v. Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue, 508 F.2d 915, 39 A.L.R. 
Fed. 299 (9th Cir. 1974), holding that certain 
greenhouses were buildings, rather than 
machines, because the taxpayer's employees 
spent their full work days within them. 
The fact that a structure could be physi-
cally altered to serve building-like, as well 
as machine-like functions, was held to be 
irrelevant to its tax status in Yellow 
Freight System, Inc. v. United States, 413 
F.Supp. 357 (W.D.Mo.1975), rev'd. on other 
grounds, 538 F.2d 790 (8th Cir. 1976). The 
court observed: 
Indeed, in their present form the struc-
tures are of no use to plaintiff or anyone 
else except for the purposes for which 
they were specifically designed and for 
which they are used. The fact that ex-
penditures for labor and materials might 
render a structure suitable for other uses 
" '[Legislative acts must be construed from 
their own language, uninfluenced by what the 
persons introducing or preparing the bill actu-
ally intended to accomplish by it.' Moorman 
Mfg Co. v Industrial Comm., 241 Wis. 200, 5 
N W.2d 743" [quoting Estate of Matzke, 250 
Wis 204, 208. 26 N.W 2d 659. 661 (1947)]. But 
see Buehler Bros. v. Industrial Comm., 220 Wis. 
371. 373-74, 265 N.W. 227 (1936); Pellett v. 
Industrial Commission, 162 Wis 596, 601, 156 
NW. 956 (1916), Sutherland, 2A Statutory 
Construction sec. 48.12 at 214-15 (4th ed. 
1973). 
5. Cf. Master Lock Co. v. Department of Reve-
nue, 62 Wis.2d 716, 215 N.W.2d 529 (1974); 
Columbia Hospital Asso. v. Milwaukee, 35 
Wis.2d 660, 670, 151 N.W.2d 750 (1967). 
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does not alter the fact that the structure 
in its unaltered state is not a 'building' 
Id. at 370. 
The use-function approach has also been 
employed by state courts. In Gulf Oil Corp. 
v. Philadelphia, 357 Pa. 101, 53 A.2d 250, 
172 A.L.R. 302 (1947), the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court overturned a lower court's rul-
ing that oil refinery tanks were not "ma-
chinery" entitled to exemption. In lan-
guage especially pertinent to the malt ele-
vators at issue in this case, the supreme 
court criticized the lower court's logic in 
concluding that because the action which 
took place in the tanks was "chemical," and 
not "mechanical," the tanks were merely 
processing agents and not manufacturing 
machinery. 357 Pa. at 108, 53 A.2d at 253, 
172 A.L.R. at 307. The court said: 
Much of the machinery today has only 
passive or motionless functions to per-
form in manufacturing. 
It is as logical to hold that the storage 
tanks in which take place physical and 
chemical processes necessary to the re-
finement of oil, are machinery as it is to 
hold that the smelters used in making 
metal are machinery. 357 Pa. at 109-110, 
53 A.2d at 254, 172 A.L.R. at 307-08. 
[Footnote omitted.]6 
See also Board of Assessors of Swampscott 
v. Lynn Sand & Stone Co., 360 Mass. 595, 
277 N.E.2d 97, 99 & 99 n.3 (1971), which 
held that "certain very bulky machinery:" 
such as a 50-ton silo and a 300-ton sand bin 
did not lose their "predominant aspect" as 
manufacturing machinery entitled to tax 
exemption merely by virtue of bulk or be-
ing affixed to buildings which themselves 
were taxable as real estate. 
The department has brought to our atten-
tion Pu6//c Service Elec. & Gas Co. v. TP. of 
6. The supreme court was also critical ot the 
lower court's conuction that silos, to which it 
had likened the refiners tanks, would not be 
exempt from taxation, observing 
Insofar as a silo's function is merel\ preserv-
ative it has no part in manufacturing but as 
the fermentation of the silage in the silo 
torms certain organic acids which prevent 
the development ot molds on the fodder a silo 
does have, pro tanto, a part in the manufac-
turing of silage The fermentation which 
Woodbridge, 73 N.J. 474, 375 A.2d 1165 
(1977), which held that structures housing 
energy generating apparatus of electric 
light and power companies were taxable 
"buildings," and not exempt "machinery" 
under that state's statutes. A lower court 
had held that such structures were exempt 
because they were " 'adapted and adaptable 
only to shelter and support generating 
equipment' and are therefore, in effect, 
'Electric Generating Stations' 
and hence part of the 'machinery, apparatus 
and equipment' exempt from direct proper-
ty taxation under the act." 73 N.J. at 
477-78, 375 A.2d at 1166. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court's disapproval of the lower 
court's determination does not support the 
department's position on this appeal. The 
supreme court noted that the structures in 
question were more than just shelters for 
equipment because they "are also workplac-
es for personnel," containing control rooms 
with such conveniences as heating, air con-
ditioning, and toilets. It said that the word 
"building" must be given its "generally ac-
cepted meaning," and approved the follow-
ing definition: 
A "building" in the usual and ordinary 
acceptation of the word is a structure 
designed and suitable for habitation or 
sheltering human beings and animals, 
sheltering or storing property, or for use 
and occupation for trade or manufacture. 
73 N.J. at 479, 375 A.2d at 1167. [Em-
phasis in original.] 
That definition, which is comparable to 
the more detailed definition of "building 
and structural components" set forth in 26 
C.F.R. sec. 1.48-1(e) with respect to the 
investment credit exception,7 cannot be said 
to apply to any of the three structures at 
issue in this case. None of them is designed 
or suitable for the shelter of persons, occu-
goes on in the silo produces, under proper 
conditions, sweet silage" as fodder To that 
extent the silo ma\ be properh considered as 
part of the machinery ot producing fodder 
357 Pa at 110 n 2, 53 A 2d at 254 n 2, 172 
A L R at 308 n 2 
7. 26 C F R sec 1 48 1(e)(1) defines "buildings 
and structural components" in pertinent part 
as follows 
The term "building" generally means any 
structure or edifice enclosing a space within 
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pation, or simple storage. Each is designed 
to process raw materials into a final prod-
uct, and for no other purpose. They are 
also used for that and no other purpose. 
A definition of "buildings'* and of "ma-
chinery and equipment" which emphasizes 
actual function and use over physical ap-
pearance, sheer size, and remotely potential 
use, elevates substance over form. It also 
makes sense. Internal correspondence of 
the department, which are exhibits to the 
parties1 stipulation, indicate that the de-
partment has inclined towards the function-
al approach as a matter of policy with re-
spect to air conditioners and humidifiers, 
wood-kilns, brewery fermenting tanks, cer-
tain equipment used to age natural cheeses, 
and other items which in its view either are 
or "may have to be considered" as machin-
ery entitled to exemption under the statute. 
As to such items, the department, like the 
other authorities cited in the opinion, has 
taken a broader view of the scope of the tax 
benefits granted to manufacturing machin-
ery, as opposed to buildings, than the view 
which it now urges on this court. It offers 
no basis for distinction between air condi-
tioners and attemporators, wood kilns and 
malt kilns, cheese aging equipment and 
its walls, and usually covered by a roof, the 
purpose of which is, for example, to provide 
shelter or housing or to provide working, 
office, parking, display, or sales space. The 
term includes, for example, structures such 
as apartment houses, factory and office 
buildings, warehouses, barns, garages, rail-
way or bus stations, and stores 
Such term does not include (i) a structure 
which is essentially an item of machinery or 
equipment, or (11) a structure which houses 
property used as an integral part of an activi-
ty specified in section 48(a)(l)(B)(i) if the use 
of the structure is so closely related to the 
use of such property that the structure clear-
ly can be expected to be replaced when the 
property it initially houses is replaced Fac-
tors which indicate that a structure is closely 
related to the use of the property it houses 
include the fact that the structure specifically 
designed to provide for the stress and other 
demands of such property and the fact that 
the structure could not be economically used 
for other purposes. Thus, the term "build-
ing" does not include such structures as oil 
and gas storage tanks, gram storage bins, 
silos, fractionating towers, blast furnaces, ba-
sic oxygen furnaces, coke ovens, brick kilns, 
and coal tipples. 
malt aging-blending elevators. This court 
perceives no possible distinction. 
For these reasons the judgment of the 
trial court is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
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Thomas SCHWAAB, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
TOWN OF SUMMIT, Robert Hasselkus 
and Michael Jones, individually and as a 
member of the Town Board, Defend-
ants-Respondents. 
No. 79-1831. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. 
Argued May 28, 1980. 
Opinion Released Aug. 22, 1980. 
Opinion Filed Aug. 22, 1980. 
Town chairman brought declaratory 
judgment action challenging validity of an 
(2) The term "structural components" in-
cludes such parts of a building as walls, par-
titions, floors, and ceilings, as well as any 
permanent coverings therefor such as panel-
ing or tiling, windows and doors; all compo-
nents relating to the operation or 
maintenance of a building. However, the 
term "structural components" does not in-
clude machinery the sole justification for the 
installation of which is the fact that such 
machinery is required to meet temperature or 
humidity requirements which are essential 
tor the operation of other machinery or the 
processing of materials or foodstuffs Ma-
chinery may meet the "sole justification" test 
provided by the preceding sentence even 
though it incidentally provides for the com-
fort of employees, or serves, to an insubstan-
tial degree, areas where such temperature or 
humidity requirements are not essential. For 
example, an air conditioning and hunrudifica-
tion system installed in a textile plant in 
order to maintain the temperature or humidi-
ty within a narrow optimum range which is 
critical in processing particular types of yarn 
or cloth is not included within the term 
"structural components." [Empha-
sis supplied.] 
EXHIBIT B 
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PABST BREWING COMPANY, a for-
eign corporation, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CITY OF MILWAUKEE, a municipal 
corporation, Defendant and 
Co-Appellant, 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 84-2023. 
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin. 
Submitted on Briefs May 7, 1985. 
Opinion Released July 15, 1985. 
Opinion Filed July 15, 1985. 
Review Denied. 
Brewing company sought declaratory 
judgment on the tax status of certain struc-
tures. The Circuit Court, Milwaukee Coun-
ty, Hugh R. O'Connell and Rudolph T. Ran-
da, JJ., determined that such structures 
were exempt from property tax and that 
brewing company was entitled to refund of 
taxes paid between 1974 and 1983. City 
and Department of Revenue appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Sullivan, J., held 
that: (1) barley bins, malt house, head 
house, and cellars were machinery or 
equipment exclusively and directly used in 
the production of beer and, thus, were ex-
empt from property tax, but (2) trial court's 
declaration as to tax status of such struc-
tures for the years 1981, 1982, and 1983, 
which years were subsequent to the years 
in issue at trial, was improper. 
Judgment and order affirmed in part 
and reversed in part. 
1. Appeal and Error <£»842(9) 
When question on appeal is whether 
statutory concept embraces a particular set 
of factual circumstances, reviewing court is 
generally presented with a mixed question 
of law and fact. 
2. Stipulations <&=>14(10) 
Where party stipulated to the essentl 
facts, Court of Appeals was faced osd 
with ultimate question of whether the fail 
fulfilled statutory standards that would 8 
empt the structures from property ttij 
which question was a question of lawlj 
which the Court would not defer to the tria 
court. W.S.A. 70.11(27). 
3. Appeal and Error <8=>842(1) 
On questions of law, the Court of Aj 
peals does not defer to the trial cour1 
4. Administrative Law and Procedui 
e=*760 
Where administrative agency's expw 
Use is significant to the determinate 
Court of Appeals will accord some weig| 
to agency's decision, but that decision 
not controlling. 
5. Taxation e»204(2) 
Tax exemption statute is to be s
 i 
construed against granting the exemptioi 
6. Taxation <£»251 
Burden of bringing property in quel 
tion within terms of tax exemptior ia <* 
taxpayer. 
7. Taxation «=>204(2) 
Tax exemption statute need not uc gn 
etf the narrowest possible construction. 
8. Taxation <3=>237 
A structure's external appearance does 
not determine whether it is a "building" for 
purposes of W.S.A. 70.11(27), exempting 
manufacturing machinery and equipment, 
but not buildings, from property tax; rath-
er, question is whether structure is being 
used as a building in taxpayer's hand*. 
9. Taxation <fc»237 
In determining whether a structure 
functions as a "building" in taxpayer*! 
hands, for purposes of W.S.A. 70.11(27), 
exempting manufacturing machinery and 
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equipment, but not buildings, from proper-
ty tax, court must first determine whether 
structure was designed, and is principally 
employed, to provide shelter or housing to 
humans or animals; storage for property; 
or working, office, parking, sales, or dis-
play space for trade or industry. 
10. Taxation <s»237 
Under the function or use test used to 
determine whether a structure constitutes 
manufacturing machinery or equipment ex-
empt from property tax under W.S.A. 70.-
11(27), question asked is whether struc-
ture's utility is "principally and primarily" 
a significant contributing factor in a prod-
uct's manufacture. 
11. Taxation <^237 
Incidental use of manufacturing prop-
erty for nonexempt purpose does not vio-
late requirement of W.S.A. 70.11(27), ex-
empting manufacturing machinery and 
equipment from property tax, that manu-
facturing machinery and specific process-
ing equipment be exclusively used in manu-
facturing tangible personal property. 
12. Taxation e=>237 
Phrase "directly used," used in W.S.A. 
70.11(27), exempting manufacturing ma-
chinery and equipment from property tax, 
must be defined without resort to hyper-
technicality. 
13. Taxation <&=»237 
Degree of passivity in a structure, e.g., 
motionless character of its walls, is not an 
absolute bar to the structure functioning 
directly as a machine and, thus, being ex-
empt from property tax under W.S.A. 70.-
11(27); thus, chemical action within a struc-
ture may be as legitimate, for such exemp-
tion purposes, as mechanical action. 
14. Taxation «=»237 
Overliteral approach is not to be used 
in resolving issue as to whether a structure 
constitutes a building or building compo-
nent, or whether structure constitutes ma-
chinery/equipment exclusively and directly 
used in manufacture of property and, thus, 
exempt from property tax under W.S.A. 
70.11(27). 
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15. Taxation <s=>237 
Barley bins, in which barley kernels 
were "rested" or maintained at controlled 
temperatures and humidity to prevent pre-
mature germination, were directly and ex-
clusively used in process of brewing beer 
to foster an organic process and not merely 
to store grain and, thus, were exempt from 
property tax as processing "equipment" 
under W.S.A. 70.11(27). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
16. Taxation <s=>237 
Fact that some human activity, inciden-
tal to a structure's function, is carried on 
within the structure does not mean that the 
structure provides general working space 
so as to preclude exemption from property 
tax as manufacturing machinery or equip-
ment under W.S.A. 70.11(27). 
17. Taxation <3=>237 
Working space provided in malt house 
was merely incidental to principal function 
or use of malt house as an artificial envi-
ronment conducive to transformation of 
barley into malt for the production of beer 
and, thus, did not preclude exemption of 
malt house from property tax as processing 
"equipment" under W.S.A. 70.11(27), where 
employee activity in malt house was gener-
ally confined to machinery hall, due to fact 
that kiln in malt house was too hot and 
germinating room was too humid. 
18. Taxation <s=>237 
Malt house was not merely a shelter 
for equipment or storage place for grain 
but, instead, was a significant factor in the 
production of beer and, thus, was exempt 
from property tax as processing "equip-
ment" under W.S.A. 70.11(27), where walls, 
floors, and roof of malt house were inte-
gral to its function insofar as they kept in 
attemperated air, and principal and primary 
function of germinating room portion of 
malt house was to create artificial environ-
ment conducive to transformation of barley 
into malt. 
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19. Taxation <®=»237 
If major portion of structure is con-
ceded to be machinery or equipment used 
exclusively and directly in manufacturing, 
portion of that structure containing equip-
ment incidental to that structure's function 
is also exempt from property tax under 
W.S.A. 70.11(27), exempting manufacturing 
machinery or equipment from property tax. 
20. Taxation <3=*237 
Head house, which sat atop malt bins 
and was 56-foot tall structure of poured 
concrete whose sole purpose was to sup-
port cleaning and transferring equipment 
through which malt had passed on its jour-
ney from malt house into malt bins and 
from those bins to brew house, was inciden-
tal portion of malt bins, which were exempt 
from property tax under W,S.A, 70.11(27) 
as machinery or equipment exclusively and 
directly used in the production of beer, so 
that head house itself was also exempt 
from property tax under that statute. 
21. Taxation <s=>237 
Cellars were not mere shelter, storage, 
or working space but, instead, were "ma-
chinery" that primarily, directly, and signif-
icantly contributed to the processing of 
wort into beer and, thus, were exempt from 
property tax under W.S.A. 70.11(27), where 
cellars* purpose was to support and envelop 
tanks of wort-yeast mixture in chilled, 
temperature-controlled environment essen-
tial for fermentation and aging of beer, and 
cellars were all in effect huge walk-in re-
frigerators and were designed and used for 
no purpose other than fermentation and 
aging of beer. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
22. Taxation <s=>543(9) 
Issue as to whether brewing company 
was not entitled to refund of property tax-
es, due to its failure to pay any of the 
disputed property taxes involuntarily or un-
der protest, was not raised at trial and, 
thus, was waived on appeal. 
23. Taxation <3=»251 
Trial court's declaration as to tax sta-
tus of disputed property for years subse-
quent to years in issue at trial was improp-
er, since record could contain no evidence 
to support the judgment. W.S.A. 70.11(27). 
24. Taxation <£=>237 
Tax exemption under W.S.A. 70.11(27) 
for manufacturing machinery is based on 
property use, which must be determined 
yearly. 
Bronson C. La Follette, Atty. Gen., Mad-
ison (John C. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Madison, of counsel), for defendant-appel-
lant Wis. Dept. of Revenue. 
Grant F. Langley, City Atty., Milwaukee 
(Patrick B. McDonnell, Milton Emmerson, 
and Scott G. Thomas, Asst. City Attys., 
Milwaukee, of counsel), for defendant and 
co-appellant City of Milwaukee. 
Michael, Best & Friedrich, Milwaukee 
(Rickard T. O'Neil, Jerome H. Kringel, and 
John C. Lapinski, Milwaukee, of counsel), 
for plaintiff-respondent 
Before WEDEMEYER, PJ., and MOSEE 
and SULLIVAN, JJ. 
SULLIVAN, Judge. 
The City of Milwaukee (City) and the 
Wisconsin Department of Revenue (Depart 
ment) appeal from a judgment determining 
that certain structures owned by Pabsl 
Brewing Company (Pabst) and used in th< 
brewing process were exempt from taxa 
tion because they were machinery or equip 
ment, and not buildings or building compo 
nents, within the meaning of sec. 70.11(27) 
Stats. We affirm the trial court's determi 
nation that the structures are exempt anc 
that Pabst is entitled to a refund of the 
taxes paid between 1974 and 1980. How 
ever, we reverse that portion of the judg 
ment extending Pabst's entitlement to i 
tax refund to years beyond those stipulatec 
by the parties as being in issue. We do noi 
reach the issue whether Pabst paid th< 
subject taxes under protest; that issue wai 
waived for failure to raise it at trial 
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After execution of an extensive stipula-
tion of facts, this case was tried to the 
court for one and one-half days in 1980. 
The trial was followed by the filing of 
extensive post-trial briefs. The trial court 
issued its findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in September of 1983. Stated brief-
ly, the court determined that each disputed 
structure functioned as machinery in the 
production of beer and was thus exempt 
from property taxation under sec. 70.-
11(27), Stats. The court also concluded 
that Pabst was entitled to a refund of 
general property taxes paid with respect to 
the misclassified structures. In August of 
1984 the court ordered that the order for 
judgment must include an order for refund 
of taxes paid, not only between 1973 and 
1980, but also in 1981, 1982, and 1983. The 
order for judgment and judgment were en-
tered on September 4, 1984. This appeal 
followed. 
It was stipulated by the parties that the 
demands of quality control in brewing and 
modern mass production "have led to the 
design and construction of specialized 
structures which are in every sense of the 
term 'custom-built' with particular beer-
making functions in mind." The chief legal 
issue presented is whether certain of these 
structures are "buildings or building com-
ponents" and not exclusively or directly 
used in the manufacture of beer, as the 
Department and City contend, or are, by 
their function in the beer-making process, 
not buildings but beer processing equip-
ment exclusively and directly used in manu-
facturing beer, as Pabst contends and as 
the trial court held. This issue was briefed 
by the Department, with the City joining in 
its arguments. The City briefed the issues 
whether Pabst's failure to introduce evi-
dence that it paid under protest bars its 
recovery and whether the trial court erred 
in ordering the refund of property taxes 
paid after 1980. 
Four of the structures at issue here are 
associated with the malting process, and 
four are associated with the fermenting 
process. The structures at issue that are 
associated with malting are the barley bins 
(structures 36 and 24), the malt house 
(structure 25), and the head house portion 
of the malt bins (structure 16A). The 
structures associated with the fermenting 
process are cellars 1, 3, 5 and 6. All of the 
structures involved in the lawsuit are part 
of Pabst's manufacturing plant. Not in-
volved in this case are Pabst's brew house 
(which is also part of its manufacturing 
plant), its offices and warehouse, and cer-
tain of its cellars that the Department con-
ceded were exempt. 
The malt bin portion of structure 16A is 
conceded to be exempt from property tax 
by virtue of this court's ruling on equiva-
lent malt bins in Ladish Malting Co. v. 
Department of Revenue, 98 Wis.2d 496, 
297 N.W.2d 56 (Ct.App.1980). However, 
the head house portion of the structure, 
which sits atop the malt bins, is in issue 
here. The Department also concedes ex-
emption under Ladish for Pabst's kiln, ex-
cept for one wall that adjoins the malt 
house. 
The structures in controversy function in 
the brewing process in the following man-
ner. During the malting stage, the barley 
is cleaned and graded and then "rested," 
first in structure 36 and then in structure 
24. "Resting" is a stage in which, under 
controlled temperature and humidity, the 
barley undergoes an organic change. The 
barley is next transferred to the malt 
house, structure 25. There, the barley is 
steeped in water and then placed in large 
germination compartments, where warm, 
moist air is directed over and through the 
barley. In this environment the barley ger-
minates. At a prescribed phase in the ger-
mination, the barley is transferred to the 
kiln, which adjoins the malt house. The 
kiln generates a flow of hot, dry air over 
the barley, which is now called green malt. 
The flow of air dries the malt and halts 
germination. After kilning, the malt re-
turns to structure 24, where it is cooled; 
and then it passes into the malt bins, struc-
ture 16A, for aging and blending. From 
the malt bins, the aged and blended malt is 
sent to the brew house, a structure not 
involved in this case. There, the malt un-
dergoes a process called "mashing" which 
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transforms it into a sweet liquor called 
"wort." The wort is then piped into tanks 
in the cellars, which are like giant refriger-
ators, where fermenting and aging take 
place. The end result is beer. 
I. 
[1-4] The principal question presented 
for review is whether the trial court cor-
rectly ruled that Pabst's grain bins, malt 
house, the head house portion of its malt 
bin, and certain cellars not conceded by the 
Department to be exempt were exempt 
from property tax under sec. 70.11(27), 
Stats, because they were not buildings or 
building components and were exclusively 
and directly used in the manufacture of 
tangible personal property within the 
meaning of sec. 70.11(27). When the ques-
tion on appeal is whether a statutory con-
cept embraces a particular set of factual 
circumstances, the reviewing court is gen-
erally presented with a mixed question of 
fact and law. See Nottelson v. DILHR, 94 
Wis.2d 106, 115-16, 287 N.W.2d 763, 767-
68 (1980). In this case the parties stipu-
lated to the essential facts, i.e., the various 
roles of the structures in the brewing pro-
cess. Thus, we are faced only with the 
ultimate question of whether the facts, in 
the case of each structure, fulfill the statu-
tory standards that would exempt the 
structures from property taxation. This is 
a question of law. See Department of 
Revenue v. Bailey-Bokrman Steel Corp., 
93 Wis.2d 602, 606, 287 N.W.2d 715, 717 
(1980). On questions of law, we do not 
defer to the trial court. Id. Where an 
administrative agency's expertise is signifi-
cant to the determination, we will accord 
some weight to its decision, but it is not 
controlling. Nottelson, 94 Wis.2d at 117, 
287 N.W.2d at 768. 
Section 70.11(27), Stats., exempts from 
property taxation "[manufacturing ma-
chinery and specific processing equipment, 
exclusively and directly used by a manufac-
turer in manufacturing tangible personal 
property." The section defines manufac-
turing machinery and specific processing 
equipment as 
any combination of electrical, mechanical 
or chemical means, including special 
foundations therefor, designed to work 
together in the transformation of materi-
als or substances into new articles or 
components, including parts therefor, re-
gardless of ownership and regardless of 
attachment to real property. This shall 
not be construed to include materials, 
supplies, buildings or building compo-
nents (Emphasis added). 
This section has been in effect since the 
1974 tax assessment. See ch. 90, Laws of 
1973. 
[5-7] A tax exemption statute is to be 
strictly construed against granting the ex-
emption, and the burden of bringing the 
property in question within the terms of 
the exemption is on the taxpayer. Ladish, 
98 Wis.2d at 502, 297 N.W.2d at 58. An 
exemption statute need not be given the 
narrowest possible construction. "A strict 
but reasonable construction seems to be 
the pithy and popular statement of the 
rule." Id. (citations omitted). 
In enacting sec. 70.11(27), Stats., the 
"legislature plainly intended to exempt 
manufacturing machinery and equipment 
exclusively used in transforming raw prod-
ucts into merchantable goods, while with-
holding the exemption from buildings and 
building components." Ladish, 98 Wis.2d 
at 503, 297 N.W.2d at 58. Thus, we are 
primarily concerned with two concepts con-
tained in sec. 70.11(27). We are concerned 
with whether the disputed property is 
"manufacturing machinery" "exclusively 
and directly" used in manufacturing tangi-
ble personal property and with whether the 
disputed property is a "building" or "build-
ing component." 
In making these determinations we fol-
low the "function or use" test adopted by 
this court in Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 506-11, 
297 N.W.2d at 60-62, and by the supreme 
court in Department of Revenue v. Greet-
ing, 112 Wis.2d 602, 607, 334 N.W.2d 118, 
121 (1983). In Ladish we held that Ladish 
Malting Company's attemperators, kilns 
and malt elevators were exempt from taxa-
tion under sec. 70.11(27), Stats., despite the 
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fact that all of the structures had "walls, 
floors, and ceilings or roofs" and had a 
" 'building-like' appearance from the out-
side." See 98 Wis.2d at 499, 297 N.W.2d at 
57. We rejected the "physical appearance" 
test in favor of a functional analysis under 
which the central question is whether the 
structure is one " 'whose utility is principal-
ly and primarily a significantly contributive 
factor in the actual manufacture or produc-
tion of the product itself.' " Id. at 506, 297 
N.W.2d at 60 (citation omitted). We con-
cluded that each disputed structure was 
"designed [and used] to process raw mate-
rials into a final product, and for no other 
purpose." Id. at 510, 297 N.W.2d at 62. 
Citing Ladish, the supreme court in 
Greiling adopted the "use or function" 
test. In Greiling the issue was whether a 
greenhouse was a "machine" exempt from 
the use tax under sec. 77.54(3), Stats. The 
supreme court decided that the functional 
characteristics of a greenhouse made it a 
machine for purposes of the use tax exemp-
tion: "(This greenhouse] cannot be viewed 
merely as a storage facility because it has 
an active function of creating and control-
ling an environment conducive to the pro-
duction of floricultural crops. . . . On this 
record, it has no other purpose or function, 
nor could it be successfully adapted to an-
other use." 112 Wis.2d at 607, 334 N.W.2d 
at 121. 
[8] Greiling and Ladish make it clear 
that a structure's external appearance does 
not determine whether it is a building. 
Rather, the question is whether the struc-
ture is being used as a building in the 
taxpayer's hands. Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 
506, 297 N.W.2d at 60 (citing Brown-For-
man Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 
F.2d 1263, 1271, 205 CtCl. 402 (1974)). An 
emphasis on function elevates substance 
over form. Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 510, 297 
N.W.2d at 62. 
The question whether a structure is a 
building arises frequently under federal 
tax law in relation to the investment credit 
section of the Internal Revenue Code, 
which employs the phrase, "building and its 
structural components." See I.R.C. sec. 
48(a)(1)(B). We note that when sec. 70.-
11(27), Stats., was drafted, representatives 
of industry asked the legislature to substi-
tute the more restrictive phrase "buildings 
or building components" for the originally 
drafted phrase "structures or fixtures" in 
order to obtain greater conformity with 
I.R.C. sec. 48(a)(1)(B) and the body of case 
law that had developed around it. See 
Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 504-05, 297 N.W.2d at 
59. The federal regulations define "build-
ing" as "any structure or edifice enclosing 
a space within its walls, and usually cover-
ed by a roof, the purpose of which is, for 
example, to provide shelter or housing, or 
to provide working, office, parking, display, 
or sales space." 26 C.F.R. sec. 1.48-l(e)(l) 
(1984). The term does not include "a struc-
ture which is essentially an item of machin-
ery or equipment" and "does not include 
such structures as oil and gas storage 
tanks, grain storage bins, silos, fractionat-
ing towers, blast furnaces, basic oxygen 
furnaces, coke ovens, brick kilns, and coal 
tipples." Id. 
A similar definition, referred to in Lad-
ish, 98 Wis.2d at 509, 297 N.W.2d at 61, 
was that of the New Jersey Supreme Court 
in Public Service Electric & Gas Co. v. 
Township of Woodbridge, 73 N.J. 474, 375 
A.2d 1165, 1167 (1977): "A building in the 
usual and ordinary acceptation of the word 
is a structure designed and suitable for 
habitation or sheltering human beings and 
animals, sheltering or storing property, or 
for use and occupation for trade or manu-
facture." 
[9] Thus, in asking whether a structure 
functions as a building in the taxpayer's 
hands, we must first ask whether the struc-
ture was designed, and is principally em-
ployed, to provide shelter or housing to 
humans or animals; storage for property; 
or working, office, parking, sales, or dis-
play space for trade or industry. The De-
partment would have us conclude, under 
the instant facts, that the structures at 
issue house people and machines and pro-
vide industrial working space and, thus, are 
buildings. The Department also urges 
that, whatever label one affixes to the 
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structures, they are not "exclusively and 
directly used in the manufacture of tangi-
ble personal property." 
[10,11] The phrase "exclusively used" 
is defined for tax exemption purposes in 
Black's Law Dictionary 507 (5th ed. 1979) 
as "[having] reference to primary and in-
herent [use] as over against a mere second-
ary and incidental use." While neither 
Ladish nor Greiling defines "exclusive and 
direct use," their adoption of the function 
or use test implies that "exclusively" does 
not have to mean "solely" or "purely" but 
rather "principally and primarily." Under 
the function or use test, the question asked 
is whether the structure's utility is "princi-
pally and primarily" a significant contribu-
ting factor in the product's manufacture. 
Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 506, 297 N.W.2d at 60. 
Incidential use of manufacturing property 
for a nonexempt purpose does not violate 
the exclusivity requirement of sec. 70.-
11(27), Stats. Manitowoc Co. v. City of 
Sturgeon Bay, 122 Wis.2d 406, 414, 362 
N.W.2d 432, 437 (Ct.App.1984). 
[12,13] Similarly, the phrase "directly 
used" must be defined without resort to 
hypertechnicality. A degree of passivity in 
a structure, e.g., the motionless character 
of its walls, is not an absolute bar to its 
functioning directly as a machine. Chemi-
cal action within a structure may be as 
legitimate, for these purposes, as mechani-
cal action. See Ladish, 98 Wis.2d at 507-
08, 297 N.W.2d at 61. 
[14] Thus, we do not deem it inconsist-
ent with the rule of strict construction to 
reject an over-literal approach to the ques-
tion whether a structure constitutes a 
building or building component or machin-
ery/equipment exclusively and directly 
used in the manufacture of property. See 
Honeywell Information Systems, Inc. v. 
County of Sonoma, 44 Cal.App.3d 23, 118 
Cal.Rptr. 422, 425 (1974) (phrase "exclu-
sively used," in context of property tax 
exemption for property exclusively used 
for public schools, construed to allow inci-
dental other uses necessary to and in fur-
therance of primary use). Our supreme 
court has avoided hypertechnical applies 
tions of property tax exemption statutes. 
See, e.g., Family Hospital Nursing Home 
v. City of Milwaukee, 78 Wis.2d 312, 320-
23, 254 N.W.2d 268, 273-75 (1977) (phras* 
"used exclusively," in context of tax ex* 
emption for property used exclusively foj 
benevolent purposes, construed to allow be-
nevolent association to charge fees to nurs-
ing home patients, to reimburse directors 
for expenses, and to claim exemption for 
post-construction period when nursing 
home was being readied for patient occu-
pancy). We now turn to an analysis at 
each structure at issue. 
THE BARLEY BINS 
[15] The barley bins in structures 38 
and 24 are separate physical entities M 
historical reasons not germane to this cas$ 
the two barley bins perform a common 
function in the beer making process. Bog[ 
bins "rest" or maintain the barley kernel 
at controlled temperatures and humidity to 
prevent premature germination. Properly 
timed and uniform germination is essential 
to large scale malting, and this uniform 
germination could not take place without 
resting the barley. Contrary to the De-
partment's assertion, the function of the 
barley bins is not the passive storage of 
barley kernels. The barley actually under-
goes an organic change when it rests, and 
the parties so stipulated: 
For reasons which have not been scien-
tifically pinpointed, freshly harvested, 
"country-run" barley goes through a pe-
riod of "dormancy" following harvesting, 
during which time individual barley ker-
nels will germinate at uneven, non-uni-
form rates or not at all. The period of 
dormancy varies for different barley 
strains, but is generally around six 
weeks. Since large scale malting re-
quires even, uniform barley germination, 
the barley must be permitted to "rest" 
until the dormancy period "breaks" in 
order to reach good germinating energy 
and capacity for malting. 
It appears to us to be beyond controversy 
that the use of the barley bins "is commit-
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ambitious purpose' than Ladish The Department's refusal to ex-ted to a more 
mere storage See Ladish, 98 Wis 2d at 
503, 297 N W 2d at 59 
Pabst cites a federal court case concern-
ing the tax status, for investment credit 
purposes, of tobacco sheds used to age 
tobacco In Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp v United States, 369 F Supp 1283 
(W D Ky 1973), affd per curiam, 491 F 2d 
1258 (6th Cir 1974), the district court noted 
that the aging process was an essential and 
integral part of the manufacture of tobacco 
products and that the sheds in issue were 
specially designed and built for fostering 
this organic process Id, 369 FSupp at 
1285 The court concluded that the sheds 
were not "buildings," but storage facilities 
entitled to the investment credit Id at 
1288 
Insofar as the barley bins perform an 
integral function m the production of malt, 
we must conclude that they are "directly 
used" in the brewing process They are 
also "exclusively" so used since their use is 
devoted entirely to maintaining proper 
temperature and humidity ranges under 
different weather conditions for the resting 
of barley The bins are used for no other 
purpose The bins were designed and con-
structed to foster an organic process and 
not merely to store gram As such, they 
do not function as buildings but, rather, as 
processing equipment Just as in Gretling, 
these structures create "the artificial envi-
ronment necessary to produce" a product 
and, as such, can be considered machines 
112 Wis 2d at 606, 334 NW2d at 120 
We conclude that the principal utility of 
Pabst's barley bins is a significant factor m 
the production of beer We thus hold that 
the bins are exempt from property tax un-
der sec 70 11(27), Stats 
THE MALT HOUSE 
The malt house, structure 25, has two 
mam parts, the germinating room and the 
malt kiln The Department concedes ex-
emption for three of the four kiln walls 
The Department acknowledges, with the 
exception of the fourth wall, that the kiln is 
equivalent to the kiln held tax-exempt in 
empt the fourth wall of the kiln rests on its 
refusal to exempt the malt house as a 
whole It contends that the remainder of 
the malt house (the germinating room) is a 
building or building component 
The function of the malt house is to 
convert barley into malt on a large scale 
The house has six stones, multiple rooms, 
stairs, an elevator, and office space The 
principal parts of the germinating room 
portion of the malt house are the steep 
tank area, the germination compartment 
area, and the spray deck The germinating 
room's steep tanks are filled with heated, 
aerated water into which barley is sub-
merged to begin the germination process. 
The barley is conveyed to germination com-
partments after it has been steeped The 
compartments are large vats or troughs in 
which the temperature, moisture, and car-
bon dioxide content are controlled The 
steep tanks and germination compartments 
are themselves exempt from taxation 
A complex air circulation and attempera-
tion system is built into the malt house. 
Through a network of air shafts, fresh air 
is directed m and through the gram beds, 
and foul air out, in such a way as to 
achieve the transformation of the barley 
into green malt The very walls, floors, 
and roof of the structure are part of the 
network of fresh and foul air shafts The 
process of attemperatmg the fresh air 
starts in the "spray deck" on the top floor 
of the malt house, where outside air is 
conditioned and humidified From there, 
the air is sent through openings to flow 
into the grain compartments throughout 
the malt house Twenty four-hour moni-
toring of the temperature levels in each 
germination compartment is maintained by 
Pabst employees who make the necessary 
air flow adjustments to keep the tempera-
ture within a specific range 
The Department stipulated before trial 
that the spray deck was a giant air condi-
tioner-humidifier, the Department asserts, 
however, that the malt house as a whole is 
not principally or primarily a giant air con-
ditioner-humidifier, as were the attempera-
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tors in Ladish See 98 Wis 2d at 499-500, 
297 N Vtf 2d at 57 The Department con 
tends that the malt house is no different 
from any ordinary industrial building con-
taining an air circulation system to get rid 
of smoke, dust or smells generated by the 
manufacturing activities carried on within 
The malt house, argues the Department, is 
simply housing for the machinery, equip-
ment, and employees who facilitate the con 
version of barley into malt 
We are persuaded otherwise Again, un-
der a functional analysis, we cannot say 
that the malt house was designed, and is 
principally employed, merely to provide 
shelter for equipment, storage for gram, 
and working space for employees 
[16,17] We first reject the notion that 
the malt house is a shelter for employees to 
work Granted, there are control room ar-
eas where employees monitor equipment 
function, and there is an office for the 
supervisor of malt house employees How-
ever, it appears that the employee activity 
in the malt house for purposes of tempera-
ture monitoring, operation, and mainte-
nance is no different m type or degree 
from that considered incidental in Ladi$h 
See id at 501, 297 N W 2d at 58 Employ 
ee activity in the malt house is generally 
confined to the machinery hall, which con-
tains levers for operating the kiln floors, 
monitoring and other equipment for the 
germinating room and kiln, the supervi-
sor's office, the elevator, and the stairwell 
The elevator and stairwell provide access to 
the different levels to check the machinery 
Outside of the machinery hall, there is little 
employee involvement in the malt house, 
the kiln is too hot and the germinating 
room too humid The germinating room is 
monitored on an almost totally automated 
basis Indeed, as m Lad\&h> human entry 
may be gained only through an airlock, due 
to vast differences in air pressure See id 
The fact that some human activity inciden-
tal to a structure's function, is carried on 
within the structure, does not mean that 
the structure provides general working 
space See Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 
369 F Supp at 1288 We conclude that the 
working space provided in the malt house 
is merely incidental to its principal function 
or use See Ladish, 98 Wis 2d at 506, 297 
N W 2d at 60 
[18] We likewise reject the assertion 
that the malt house is merely a shelter for 
equipment or a storage place for grain. 
The gram undergoes an organic transfor-
mation in the malt house, just as in the 
barley bins Pabst presented uncontradict-
ed expert testimony to the effect that each 
area of the malt house is the large scale 
functional equivalent of small-scale machin-
ery counterparts m Pabst's small pilot 
plant The walls, floors, and roof of the 
malt house are integral to its function inso-
far as they keep in the attemperated air 
The principal and primary function of the 
germinating room portion of the malt 
house is to create an artificial environment 
conducive to the transformation of barley 
the greenhouse in Grexling See 112 
Wis 2d at 606-07, 334 N W 2d at 120-21. 
The Department contends that exempt 
ing the Pabst malt house would invalidate 
the "buildings or building components" ex-
ception to the exemption provided in sec 
70 11(27), Stats, by placing "untold num-
bers" of custom-built factory buildings 
"completely beyond taxation" We can 
only determine whether the structures in 
the case before us are exempt under the 
statute as it is written This court does not 
make tax policy 
We conclude that the entire malt house 
functions as machinery or equipment be-
cause its principal utility is a significant 
factor m the production of beer Accord-
ingly, we hold that the entire malt house \s 
exempt from taxation under sec 70 11(27), 
Stats 
THE HEAD HOUSE 
The head house, which sits atop the malt 
bins, structure 16A, was described in the 
Stipulation of Facts as a "56-feet tall struc-
ture of poured concrete" whose *sol« 
purpose is to support cleaning and 
transferring equipment through which the 
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malt must pass on its journey from the 
Malt House into the bins and from the bins 
to the Brew House." Although the De-
partment is now exempting all of the malt 
bin portion of structure 16A, it argues that 
the head house portion of the structure 
may not be exempted because it is a build-
ing. The Department asserts that the head 
house encloses and protects cleaning and 
conveying equipment from the elements 
and, as such, is merely a shelter for proper-
ty. 
According to the Stipulation of Facts, 
structure 16A was designed and is used "to 
protect the malt from moisture and ex-
treme variations of temperature and hu-
midity and to age and blend the malt on a 
large scale." To get to the malt bins for 
aging and blending, the malt must be con-
veyed from the malt house. After aging 
and blending, the malt must be conveyed 
from the malt bins to the brew house for 
mashing. The cleaning and transferring 
equipment that takes the malt in and out of 
the malt bins is contained in the head 
house. The cleaning and transferring 
equipment is itself exempt. 
[19,20] It is undisputed that the head 
house is a "part" of structure 16A and that 
structure 16A, except for the head house, 
is exempt from taxation under Ladish, 
which held that malt elevators (equivalent 
to the instant malt bins) were exempt. If 
the major portion of structure 16A is con-
ceded to be machinery or equipment used 
exclusively and directly in manufacturing, 
we must conclude that the portion of the 
structure containing equipment incidental 
to that structure's function is also exempt. 
Hence, we hold that structure 16A, in its 
entirety, is exempt from taxation because it 
is machinery or equipment exclusively and 
directly used in the production of beer. 
THE CELLARS 
After leaving the malt bins (structure 
16A), the aged and blended malt goes to 
the brew house for mashing. There, it 
becomes a sweet liquor called wort. From 
the brew house the wort is piped to tanks 
in cellars for fermentation and aging. The 
Department argues that cellars 1, 3, 5, and 
6 do not themselves perform a manufactur-
ing function but rather create a workplace 
for persons to operate already-exempted 
equipment to make beer. Pabst responds 
that the cellars function as refrigerators 
and, thus, as machines. 
The parties stipulated that fermentation 
is a carefully temperature-controlled pro-
cess consisting of two stages. In the first, 
or primary, stage the wort is combined 
with yeast and subjected to a temperature 
of 50°—57°F for seven to nine days. Un-
der these conditions, the yeast converts the 
sugar in the wort into alcohol and carbon 
dioxide. In the second stage of fermenta-
tion, the beer is transferred to other tanks 
for separation of most of the yeast from 
the wort and subjection to a temperature of 
32°F. The yeast cells remaining in the 
wort become lethargic at that temperature, 
and fermentation continues at a substan-
tially diminished rate for several weeks. 
As the wort gains in alcohol and carbon 
dioxide, it develops the taste found in com-
mercial beer. 
In earlier times, wort could be fermented 
and aged only during cool periods of the 
year or in deep subterranean cellars. Mod-
ern-day cellars are giant, above-ground 
structures that permit fermentation to take 
place the year round. 
[21] The cellars vary somewhat in con-
struction, but all serve the same purpose. 
The parties stipulated that the cellars' pur-
pose is "to support and envelop the tanks 
of the wort-yeast mixture in the chilled, 
temperature controlled environment essen-
tial for fermentation and aging." The par-
ties also stipulated that the "cellars are all 
in effect huge walk-in refrigerators and 
were designed and are used for no purpose 
other than fermentation and aging of 
beer." 
Cellar 5, the oldest cellar, is essentially a 
huge block of poured concrete in which an 
array of hollow chambers was formed as 
the concrete was being poured. The result-
ing structure resembles a honey comb. 
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The parties stipulated to the following de-
scription: 
[S]ome of the chambers are shaped and 
used to hold fermenting wort. The tops, 
bottoms, and sides of these fermenting 
chambers consist of the very same con-
crete of which the structure of cellar 5 
itself is made. Other chambers run 
above, below and in between the fer-
menting chambers and form an intercon-
nected network of ducts through which 
refrigerated air is circulated to cool the 
fermenting wort. The walls of the ducts 
themselves are the opposite face of the 
walls of the fermenting chambers. 
Thus, the ducts themselves, like the fer-
menting chambers, are formed of the 
very concrete of which Cellar 5 is made. 
The stipulation goes on to state that 
"[t]here is absolutely no purpose for which 
Cellar 5 could be used, other than the fer-
mentation or aging of beer, without sub-
stantial alterations and improvements." 
Cellars 1, 3, and 6 are constructed differ-
ently. They all have an interconnected net-
work of columns and beams forming a gal-
lery of horizontally spaced and vertically 
stacked cubicles with a single fermentation 
tank occupying each cubicle. Each tank 
rests on supports affixed directly to the 
beams and fully occupies a complete bay 
area or cubicle. The weight of each tank is 
entirely supported by the horizontal beam 
on which it rests. The beam is then con-
nected to the column nearest the tank. 
The parties stipulated that "[cjellars 1, 3 
and 6 are custom designed for and used 
only for the process of fermenting and 
aging beer" and that "[b]ecause of their 
custom designed nature, they could be con-
verted to another use only at great expense 
and only after making substantial changes 
to the existing structural arrangement." 
The Department's concessions that the 
cellars could be used for no other purpose 
than fermentation and aging of beer with-
out substantial alterations and improve-
ments is in flat contradiction to its asser-
tion that the cellars' sole purpose is to 
create employee work areas. The record 
indicates that the presence of employees in 
the cellars is occasional and is limited main-
ly to connecting or disconnecting hoses and 
taking wort samples and temperatures. 
Except for narrow drainage aisles, there is 
very little space for employees even to 
walk. Further, the temperatures are too 
low, and the air too damp, for regular 
human occupation. Again, this employee 
activity is comparable in type and degree to 
that considered incidental in Ladish, 98 
Wis.2d at 501, 297 N.W.2d at 58. 
In Brown-Forman, 499 F.2d at 1268-73, 
certain large whiskey aging structures 
were held not to be building components 
excluded from qualifying for the invest-
ment tax credit despite the fact that em-
ployees regularly entered them to load and 
unload barrels, search for and repair leaks, 
and check for temperatures and humidity. 
A case even more closely analogous to the 
one before us is Adolph Coors Co. v. Com-
missioner, 21 T.C.M. 1351 (1968). At issue 
in Coors were cellars virtually identical to 
the Pabst cellars; they were described as 
shells with steel supports to enclose and 
support very large beer tanks and related 
equipment. Id. at 1357. Employees en-
tered the cellars to check temperatures, 
pressures, and cooling systems; take beer 
samples; and fill, empty, and clean the 
tanks. The court ruled that the cellars 
were not buildings for purposes of the in-
vestment tax credit Id. at 1358. 
The Department also argues that the cel-
lars do no more than shelter the large 
tanks within and that, thus, they do not 
directly transform a substance into tangi-
ble personal property. The framing and 
walls of the cellars, it is true, play a pas-
sive role in the fermentation process, but 
so do the walls and framing of any refrig-
erator. The cellar walls hold in the air that 
cools the tanks and permits fermentation 
and aging; the cellar framing holds the 
tanks in place. In Niagara Mohawk Pow-
er Corp. v. Wanamaker, 286 A.D. 446, 144 
N.Y.S.2d 458 (1955), affd, 2 N.Y 2d 764, 
157 N.Y.S.2d 972, 139 N.E.2d 150 (1956), in 
the context of a sales and use tax exemp-
tion for property directly and exclusively 
used in the production of tangible personal 
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"[Activity is not Wis.2d 152, 312 N.W.2d 875 [Ct.App.1981], 
was raised in this action and are according-
ly not here present." The defenses in 
Heileman to which the trial court alluded 
included payment under protest. See id. at 
155, 312 N.W.2d at 876. 
The walls of the 
function in one 
thing is that all 
property, the court said: 
the test of directness, 
boiler have a 'passive' 
sense. The important 
parts of the plant contribute, continuously 
and vitally, to production, and they are all 
integrated and harmonized." Id., 144 N.Y. 
S.2d at 462. The passive nature of the 
cellar walls and framing must not be al-
lowed to obscure the fact that their sole 
reason for existence is to create the condi-
tions that permit the fermentation of beer 
on a mass-production scale. 
We conclude that cellars 1, 3, 5, and 6 are 
used principally and directly to process 
wort into beer; thus, they function as ma-
chines. The cellars were not designed, and 
are not primarily used, to provide mere 
shelter, storage, or working space; thus, 
they are not buildings or building compo-
nents. Because the cellars are machinery 
that primarily, directly, and significantly 
contributes to the manufacture of tangible 
personal property, they are exempt from 
property taxation under sec. 70.11(27), 
Stats. 
II. 
We now turn to the issues surrounding 
Pabst's entitlement to a refund of property 
taxes paid on the disputed structures. We 
first dispose of the City's charge that 
Pabst is entitled to no refund because it 
failed to prove that it had paid any of the 
taxes on the disputed property involuntari-
ly or under protest. 
The City did not raise the issue whether 
Pabst paid under protest at any time in the 
proceedings before the trial court. The 
issue was neither raised in pretrial briefs, 
nor during the trial, nor in post-trial briefs. 
The parties stipulated that the issues to be 
decided by the trial court were whether the 
structures were buildings or building com-
ponents and whether the property was ex-
clusively and directly used in manufactur-
ing. 
The trial court noted in its findings of 
fact and conclusions of law that "none of 
the major defenses raised in Heilman [sic] 
Brewing Co. v. City of LaCrosse, 105 
[22] As a general rule, an appellate 
court will not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal. County of Columbia 
v. Bylewski, 94 Wis.2d 153, 171, 288 
N.W.2d 129, 138-39 (1980). As it appears 
tha^ t the payment under protest question 
was not considered a genuine issue until 
after the City lost the case, we deem the 
issue waived. 
Both the City and the Department com-
plain on appeal that the trial court erred in 
including in its judgment the years 1981, 
1982, and 1983. The parties stipulated that 
the only years to be covered by the judg-
ment were 1974 through 1980. The De-
partment briefs the issue whether Pabst 
was entitled to a declaratory judgment on 
the tax status of the subject property for 
years after 1980, and the City briefs the 
issue whether Pabst was entitled to a judg-
ment ordering a refund for years after 
1980. The Department is not a defendant 
in Pabst's claim for a refund. 
This case dates back to 1975 when Pabst 
filed a complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment on the tax status of certain struc-
tures for the year 1974. The complaint 
was amended and expanded in 1976 to seek 
relief for 1974 and subsequent years. The 
parties subsequently entered into several 
stipulations that included agreements on 
the years to be covered by the judgment 
sought. The last of these stipulations was 
entered into in February, 1980, immediately 
prior to an evidentiary hearing. This final 
stipulation provided that the years to be 
covered by the declaratory judgment were 
1974 through 1980. In the final judgment 
entered in 1984 (four years after trial), the 
court ruled that the judgment also included 
the years 1981 through 1983. 
[23,24] The trial court's declaration as 
to the tax status of the disputed property 
for years subsequent to the years in issue 
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at trial was improper because "the record 
could contain no evidence to support" the 
judgment. See Family Hospital Nursing 
Home, 78 Wis.2d at 327, 254 N.W.2d at 
276. The tax exemption for manufacturing 
machinery is based on property use, which 
must be determined yearly. Manitowoc 
Co., 122 Wis.2d at 413, 362 N.W.2d at 436. 
Accordingly, we reverse that portion of 
the judgment extending the court's ruling 
to the years 1981, 1982, and 1983. In all 
other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 
Judgment and order affirmed in part and 
reversed in part. 
